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THE SECRET SUCCESS OF U.S. AID TO SOUTH KOREA
By Andrew S. Natsios
In  the  1950s  South  Korea  was  one  of  the  poorest  countries  in  the  world,  and  yet  today  it  is  one  of  the  richest  with  the  13th  largest  
HFRQRP\DQGDIXQFWLRQLQJSDUOLDPHQWDU\GHPRFUDF\%HWZHHQDQGSHUFDSLWDLQFRPHURVHHLJKWIROGDQGLWVHFRQRPLF
growth  rate  exceeded  1400  percent.  How  did  this  economic  miracle  take  place?  What  role  did  the  United  States  aid  program  play  
in  this  transformation?  
In  the  1950s  the  Korean  people  were  hungry,  impoverished,  and  in  poor  health.  The  U.S.  aid  program  imported  massive  amounts  
RI IRRGDLG WR IHHG WKHSRSXODWLRQEXW IRFXVHGRQ LQFUHDVLQJDJULFXOWXUDOGHYHORSPHQW WRSURGXFH IRRG IRU -DSDQHVHPDUNHWV  
'U6\QJPDQ5KHH3UHVLGHQWRI WKH5HSXEOLFRI.RUHDEHWZHHQDQG DOVRSXUVXHGDSROLF\RI LPSRUW VXEVWLWXWLRQ  
EDVHG RQ ZKDW LV FDOOHG GHSHQGHQF\ WKHRU\ 8QGHU WKLV WKHRU\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW FUHDWHG DQG VWLOO FRQWLQXH WR RZQ ORFDO  
businesses  that  produced  products  for  domestic  consumption  to  reduce  the  need  for  imports.  This  approach  has  consistently  failed  
to  produce  sustained  rates  of  growth  in  nearly  every  country  it  has  been  attempted,  including  in  South  Korea  in  the  1950s.  Typically,  
WKHJRYHUQPHQWUXQEXVLQHVVHVFUHDWHGE\ LPSRUWVXEVWLWXWLRQEHFRPHLQHI¿FLHQWPRQRSROLHV WKDW WU\ WRSURWHFW WKHLUH[FOXVLYH  
control  over  domestic  markets,  avoid  risk,  innovation,  and  improvements  in  productivity.  Thus  import  substitution  policies  impeded  
rather  than  increased  economic  growth.  
*HQHUDO3DUN&KXQJKHH¶VDVVXPSWLRQRIWKHSUHVLGHQF\LQFRLQFLGHGZLWKWKHDUULYDORIDQHZ86$,'PLVVLRQGLUHFWRU  
%HUQVWHLQZKR SURSRVHG WR 3DUN WKDW.RUHD VKLIW IRFXV IURP SURGXFLQJ DJULFXOWXUDO WR LQGXVWULDO SURGXFWV IRU H[SRUW7KLV  
DSSHDOHGWR3DUNZKRDGRSWHGWKHVWUDWHJ\DQGDSSURDFKHGWKHHIIRUWDVDPLOLWDU\FRPPDQGHU+HKHOGUHJXODUVWDIIPHHWLQJVRI  
his  cabinet  and  business   leaders  at  which  he  demanded  accountability  and  results,  established  market-­based  export  quotas  of  
industrial  goods  the  business  community  had  to  meet  based  on  market  demand,  and  created  heavy  incentives  for  those  businesses  
which  met  the  goals,  and  withdrew  incentives  when  businesses  failed  to  meet  them.  The  industrialization  effort  was  done  through  
ZKDWZHUHFDOOHGWKHFKDHEROEXVLQHVVHOLWHZKR3DUNKDGHDUOLHUSXWLQMDLOIRUFRUUXSWLRQEXWODWHUUHOHDVHGWROHDGKLVH[SRUW  
led  growth  strategy.  
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7KH3DUN VWUDWHJ\ZDVSDUW.RUHDQ DQGSDUW$PHULFDQ DQG
ZDV SDUWO\ EDVHG RQ D ERRN FDOOHG WKH6WDJHV RI(FRQRPLF
*URZWK E\ :DOWHU 5RVWRZ ZKLFK KDG MXVW FRPH RXW RQ  
development  economics.  The  author  was  a  senior  advisor  to  
ERWK3UHVLGHQW.HQQHG\DQGODWHU3UHVLGHQW-RKQVRQ5RVWRZ
argued   that   foreign   aid   could   be   used   to   accelerate   growth  
at  certain  stages  of  economic  development  in  poor  countries  
using   economists   and   other   technocrats   to   guide   the  
implementation.   USAID   provided   both   the   funding   and  
the   economists   to   the   South   Korean   government.   Michael  
3LOOVEXU\LVFXUUHQWO\ZULWLQJDQLPSRUWDQWQHZERRNEDVHGRQ
UHFHQWO\GHFODVVL¿HG&,$FDEOHVFDOOHG7KH6HFUHW6XFFHVVHV  
of   USAID   which   describes   the   aggressive   nature   of   U.S.  
efforts   in   Korea   to   ensure   that   the   growth   strategy   was  
VXFFHVVIXO$W WLPHV3DUN FRPSODLQHG WR WKH&,$ WKDW WKHVH
86$,' HFRQRPLVWV ZHUH UXQQLQJ WKH FRXQWU\²WKRXJK KH
continued  to  support  the  recommended  policies.
7KH.RUHDQHFRQRPLFPRGHOGLGQRWHQMR\XQLYHUVDOVXSSRUW
among   development   professionals   even   as   late   as   the   1970s  
when  some  questioned  whether   this  was   the  right  strategy.   It  
was  not  until  the  1980s  that  it  became  indisputably  obvious  that  
WKH3DUNVWUDWHJ\ZDVDUHPDUNDEOHVXFFHVV
What  lessons  can  we  draw  from  the  Korean  experience?  Firstly,  
JURZWKVWUDWHJLHVUHTXLUHGDORQJWLPHKRUL]RQ²WZRGHFDGHV
,W FRXOG QRW SURGXFH LPPHGLDWH YLVLEOH DQG TXDQWL¿DEOH  
results  which  policy  makers   in  Washington  often  demand  of  
aid   programs.   In   fact   none   of   the   Asian   economic   success  
VWRULHV²7DLZDQ +RQJ .RQJ 6LQJDSRUH 7KDLODQG &KLQD  
RU6RXWK.RUHD²SURGXFHGTXLFNUHVXOWV
6HFRQGO\ WR EH VXFFHVVIXO WKH VWUDWHJ\ UHTXLUHG 3UHVLGHQW
3DUN¶VVWURQJDQGDJJUHVVLYHVXSSRUWRYHUWKHHQWLUHSHULRG²  
without   local   leadership   the   strategy  would  have   failed.  This  
DOVR PHDQW GRQRUV²LQ WKLV FDVH WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV²KDG WR  
provide  consistent  support  for  the  strategy  over  a  long  period  
of   time.  The  U.S.  economic  aid  program  was  not  phased  out  
until   1982.   Without   country   leadership   the   strategy   would  
have  failed.
Thirdly,  the  strategy  would  not  have  succeeded  if  there  had  been  
a   civil   war   or  widespread   political   instability   in   South  Korea  
EHFDXVH³FDSLWDOLVDFRZDUG´DV&ROLQ3RZHOOKDVRIWHQVDLG
Investors   avoid   putting   private   capital   at   risk   in   an   unstable  
FRXQWU\ZLWKDQLQWHUQDOFRQÀLFWUDJLQJ
Fourthly,  the  fear  of  a  looming  North  Korea  on  the  other  side  of  
the  border  with  the  South  backed  by  the  Communist  Chinese  and  
6RYLHW JRYHUQPHQWVPRWLYDWHG 3UHVLGHQW 3DUN DQG WKH 6RXWK
Korean   political   and   economic   elite   to   make   their   strategy  
work.  They   took   risks,   avoided   using   aid  money   to   reward  
friends   and   loyal   supporters   with   unproductive   govern-­
PHQWMREVDQGFURQ\SURWHFWLRQVFKHPHVDSUREOHPLQPDQ\  
GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV DQG DYRLGHG PDNLQJ XQSURGXFWLYH  
but   politically   popular   economic   investments.   The   abiding  
external   threat   over   two   decades   created   the   motivation   for  
leaders  to  ensure  the  strategy  worked.  
What  worked   in  South  Korea   is   not   necessarily   a  model   for  
HYHU\ FRXQWU\ (DFK FRXQWU\ KDV LWV RZQ XQLTXH VHW RI ORFDO
challenges,   its   own   historical   narrative,   and   its   culture   and  
YDOXHV ZKLFK LQÀXHQFH LWV GHYHORSPHQW WUDMHFWRU\ %XW WKH  
Korean  growth  strategy,  which   the  U.S.  government  aid  pro-­
JUDPDFFRUGLQJWRWKH&,$GHFODVVL¿HGFDEOHVSOD\HGDPD-­
MRU UROH LQKHOSLQJ WKH6RXWK.RUHDQJRYHUQPHQW IRUPXODWH
DQGLPSOHPHQWSURGXFHGWKHMREVDQGSURVSHULW\WKDWFUHDWHG
a  South  Korean  middle   class  which   later   demanded  political  
reform,  democracy,  and  free   institutions.  Those  skeptics  who  
argue  that  foreign  aid  does  not  work  should  examine  the  shin-­
ing  example  of  South  Korea.  Other  developing  countries  could  
EHQH¿WIURPOHDUQLQJKRZ6RXWK.RUHDDFKLHYHGLWVHFRQRPLF
and  political  miracle.  
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AID BY KOREA: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES
By Lee Kye Woo
Abstract
7KLV SDSHU DLPV WR HYDOXDWH WKH SURJUHVV PDGH LQ .RUHD¶V RI¿FLDO GHYHORSPHQW DVVLVWDQFH 2'$ VLQFH  ZKHQ WKH  
FRXQWU\ DSSOLHG IRU DFFHVVLRQ WR WKH 2(&'¶V 'HYHORSPHQW$VVLVWDQFH &RPPLWWHH '$& DQG HVWDEOLVKHG LWV 0HGLXPWHUP  
$LG3ODQ8VLQJHPSLULFDOVWDWLVWLFDOGDWDLWDVVHVVHVWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI.RUHD¶V2'$DJDLQVWWKHQRUPVDQGSUDFWLFHV
of  DAC  member  countries.  In  particular,  this  study  analyzes  the  Korean  government’s  achievement  in  addressing  the  2008  concerns  
RIWKH2(&'¶V6SHFLDO5HYLHZ7HDPDERXW.RUHD¶VDLGDOORFDWLRQWRGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVDQGFRRUGLQDWLRQRIWKHSROLFLHVDQG
programs  of  its  numerous  aid  agencies.  
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Introduction
 PDUNV D VSHFLDO \HDU IRU .RUHD¶V RI¿FLDO GHYHORSPHQW  
DVVLVWDQFH 2'$ $ \HDU DIWHU .RUHD KRVWHG WKH %XVDQ  
,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQIHUHQFHRQ$LG(IIHFWLYHQHVV+/)LQ
the   country’s   aid   is   to   be   evaluated   by   the   Organization   for  
(FRQRPLF&RRSHUDWLRQDQG'HYHORSPHQW2(&'SHHUUHYLHZ
WHDP IRU WKH ¿UVW WLPH VLQFH .RUHD MRLQHG WKH 'HYHORSPHQW  
$VVLVWDQFH &RPPLWWHH '$& LQ  7KH '$& ZKLFK  
discusses   and   coordinates   member   donor   governments’  
IRUHLJQ DLG SROLFLHV LV FRPSRVHG RI WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ  
DQGWZHQW\WKUHHRIWKLUW\IRXU2(&'PHPEHUFRXQWULHV
The   DAC   conducts   a   peer   review   of   its   member   states’  
ODA   policies   and   practices   every   two   to   three   years,   and  
publishes   the   results.   The   review   will   analyze   changes   in  
Korea’s  ODA   since   it   applied   for  DAC  membership   in   2008  
and   offer   recommendations   for   future   improvement.   The  
EDVHOLQH UHIHUHQFH ZLOO PRVW OLNHO\ EH WKH 2(&'¶V   
Special   Review   Report,   which   provided   data   for   evaluating  
Korea’s  DAC  membership  application.  Although   the  review’s  
recommendations  are  not  binding,  all  DAC  members  agreed  to  
IROORZ&RPPLWWHHSROLFLHVDQGUHJXODWLRQVZKHQWKH\MRLQHG
Accordingly,   as   a  way  of   analyzing  Korea’s   aid  policies   and  
practices,   this   paper   is   intended   to   evaluate   any   changes  
RU ODFN RI FKDQJHV LQ .RUHDQ DLG VLQFH WKH 2(&'¶V   
report.  In  particular,  it  analyzes  issues  and  concerns  raised  by  
that  report  and  compares  Korean  ODA  policies  and  practices  
during  the  period  2008-­10  with  those  that  prevailed  before  the  
report  was  issued,  i.e.,  the  period  2005-­07.  
The   Special   Review   Report   urged   changes   to   the   scale   and  
terms  of  Korean  aid,  and  highlighted   two  additional  concerns.  
One   was   that   Korean   ODA   was   ineffective   mainly   due   to  
IUDJPHQWDWLRQ DLG ZDV DGPLQLVWHUHG E\ PDQ\ PLQLVWULHV DQG
other   public   agencies   without   a   coherent   legal   and   policy  
framework.  Korea’s  bilateral  ODA  was  divided  between  grants  
RIIHUHG E\.2,&$ .RUHD ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RRSHUDWLRQ$JHQF\  
under   the   policy   guidance   and   supervision   of   the   MOFAT  
0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUVDQG7UDGHDQGFRQFHVVLRQDOORDQV  
RIIHUHG E\ WKH ('&) (FRQRPLF 'HYHORSPHQW &RRSHUDWLRQ  
)XQG XQGHU WKH JXLGDQFH DQG VXSHUYLVLRQ RI WKH 026)  
0LQLVWU\RI6WUDWHJ\DQG)LQDQFH ,QDGGLWLRQ VRPHRI  
total   bilateral   grants  were   offered   by  more   than   thirty   central  
and   provincial   governments   and   independent   public  
organizations.  Multilateral   ODA  was   offered   by  more   than  
twenty   agencies   to   more   than   eighty   intergovernmental  
organizations.   Coordination   and   cooperation   between   the  
PDMRU JUDQW DQG ORDQ DJHQFLHV .2,&$02)$7 RQ WKH RQH  
KDQG DQG ('&)026) RQ WKH RWKHU DQG WKHLU SURJUDPV  
was   ineffective.  Moreover,   coordination  was   lacking   between  
WKHVH DJHQFLHVSURJUDPV DQG PRUH WKDQ WKLUW\ RWKHU JUDQW  
giving  agencies.  
The  other  concern  was  the  unclear  criteria  for  selecting  ODA  
recipient   countries   and   allocating   aid.  The  ODA  allocated   to  
recipient  countries  by  income  level  was  inconsistent  with  the  
2'$REMHFWLYHVJHQHUDOO\DJUHHGXSRQE\DOO'$&PHPEHUV
A  similar  concern  was  expressed  with  respect  to  aid  allocated  
WRUHFLSLHQWFRXQWULHVFODVVL¿HGE\UHJLRQVHFWRUDQGSURMHFW
Therefore,   in   addition   to   reviewing  changes   in   the   scale   and  
terms   of   Korea’s   ODA   since   2008,   this   paper   will   review  
shifts   in   legal  and  policy  coherence,  as  well  as  selection  and  
DOORFDWLRQ FULWHULD DV DLPHG LQ WKH 0LGWHUP 2'$ 3ODQ  
7KLVSDSHUZLOODOVRHPSLULFDOO\DQDO\]H.RUHD¶VDLG
allocation   practices   in   comparison  with   other   DAC  member  
states.  Finally,  this  paper  will  highlight  conclusions  and  future  
challenges  for  Korean  ODA.
The Scale and Terms of Aid
7KH 6SHFLDO 5HYLHZ 5HSRUW 2(&'  H[SUHVVHG  
satisfaction  with  Korea’s  plan  to  increase  ODA  and  encouraged  
a  strong  commitment.  The  incoming  Lee  Myung-­bak  govern-­
ment  in  2008  promised  to  follow  through  with  the  plan,  which  




Since  2008,  Korea  has  pursued  the  goal  with  vigor.  During  the  
SHULRG ZKHUHDV.RUHD¶V WRWDO ¿VFDO H[SHQGLWXUH LQ-­
creased  at  7  percent  per  year,  its  ODA  expenditure  rose  at  29  
percent   per   year.   In   2010,   the   net  ODA   disbursed   increased  
VKDUSO\UHDFKLQJELOOLRQWKHHTXLYDOHQWRISHUFHQW
of  GNI.  The   size   of  ODA  has   scaled   up  by  0.03  percentage  
SRLQWVHYHU\WZR\HDUVLHSHUFHQWRI*'3LQ
percent  in  2008,  and  0.12  percent  in  2010.  If  this  trend  contin-­
ues,  the  size  of  ODA  will  reach  0.27  percent  of  GNI  in  2015,  
exceeding  the  0.25  percent  goal.
Figure  1 Korea’s  Net  ODA








Total Net ODA Bilateral Grants Bilateral Loans
Source: Korea Eximbank, KOICA
Multilateral ODA
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7KH6SHFLDO5HYLHZ5HSRUWDOVRHQFRXUDJHG.RUHDWR
soften  its  ODA  terms.  A  1978  DAC  agreement  on  improving  
2'$WHUPVLQFOXGHVWKUHHVWDQGDUGV)LUVWRIDQQXDO2'$
commitments  should  be  a  grant  element.  Second,  annual  ODA  
commitments   should   be   above   the   ODA   members’   average  
SHUFHQWRI*1,LQ7KLUG2'$FRPPLWPHQWVIRU
DOO OHDVWGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV /'&V VKRXOGFRQWDLQDJUDQW
element  above  90  percent  annually,  or  ODA  commitments  for  
HDFK/'&VKRXOGFRQWDLQDJUDQWHOHPHQWDERYHSHUFHQWRQ
a  three-­year  average  basis.
.RUHD VDWLV¿HG WKH¿UVW DQG WKLUG VWDQGDUGV LQ7KHDLG
FRPPLWPHQWVFRQWDLQHGDSHUFHQWJUDQWHOHPHQWDQQXDO
aid   commitments   to   all  LDCs   reached   94.5   percent,   and   the  
three-­year  average  aid  commitment  to  each  LDC  also  exceeded  
SHUFHQW7KLVZDVPDGHSRVVLEOHQRWE\UHGXFLQJWKHVKDUHRI
loans  in  total  bilateral  ODA,  as  recommended  by  the  DAC;;  in  
fact,  the  share  of  loans  in  total  bilateral  aid  rose  steadily  from  27  
SHUFHQWLQWRSHUFHQWLQ,QVWHDG.RUHDDFKLHYHG
these  goals  mainly  by  softening  concessional  loan  terms  via  re-­
GXFWLRQVLQLQWHUHVWUDWHVXSWRSHUFHQWDQGH[WHQVLRQVRI
WKHJUDFHDQGUHSD\PHQWSHULRGVXSWRIRUW\\HDUVHVSHFLDOO\
for  those  loans  directed  to  LDCs,  green  growth,  and  climatic  
change  preparedness.  
Regarding  the  DAC’s  second  standard  for  ODA  commitments  
at   0.28   percent   of   GNI,   Korea’s   2010   ODA   commitments  
reached  only  0.20  percent   of  GNI.  However,  Korea’s  ODA  
commitment   would   approach   the   second   standard   by   2015  
if   it   attains   the  net  ODA  disbursement  goal  of  0.25  percent  
of  GNI  by  2015,   and  would  nearly  meet   it   if   its   loan  com-­
mitment   continues   to   increase   as   it   has   in   recent   years.  
(YHQ LI .RUHD¶V 2'$ GRHV QRW DWWDLQ WKH VHFRQG VWDQGDUG  
'$& PHPEHUV ZRXOG OLNHO\ XQGHUVWDQG FXUUHQWO\ )UDQFH
IDLOV WR UHDFK WKH ¿UVW VWDQGDUG 3RUWXJDO IDOOV VKRUW RI WKH  
VHFRQG VWDQGDUG DQG *UHHFH  SHUFHQW ,WDO\   
SHUFHQWDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVSHUFHQWOLNH.RUHDIDLO
to  reach  the  third  standard.  
Integrated Legal and Policy Frameworks
The   integrated  or  coherent   legal  and  policy   frameworks   for  
.RUHDQ2'$FDQEHGLVFXVVHGDWWZROHYHOVDWDOOUHFLSLHQW
countries  level  and  at  each  individual  recipient  country  level.  
First,  at  the  level  of  all  recipient  countries,  Korea  has  continu-­
ously  pursued   a   coherent   legal   and  policy   framework   since  
7KLV HIIRUW ¿QDOO\ FDPH WR IUXLWLRQ DW WKH HQG RI WKH  
0LGWHUP2'$3ODQZKHQWKHJRYHUQPHQWSURPXOJDWHGWKH
Basic  Law  on  International  Development  Cooperation  in  early  
2010.  Second,  at  the  individual  recipient  country  level,  Korea  
GHFLGHGWRSUHSDUH&RXQWU\3DUWQHUVKLS6WUDWHJ\&36SDSHUV
WRFRRUGLQDWHDOO.RUHDQDLGDJHQFLHV¶SURJUDPVDQGSURMHFWV
Basic Law and Related Mechanisms
7KH  2(&' 6SHFLDO 5HYLHZ 5HSRUW UHFRPPHQGHG D  
single   integrated   legal   framework   to  encompass  all  aid   types  
and  agencies,  and  a  single  integrated  aid  controller  to  guide  and  
supervise  all  aid  agencies  and  programs.
Basic Law
The   government   of  Korea   decided   not   to   establish   such   an  
LQWHJUDWHGDLGDJHQF\ZKLFKPD\UHTXLUHDPDMRUUHRUJDQL]D-­
tion  of  the  rights  and  responsibilities  of  many  ministries  and  
DVKDUSLQFUHDVHLQJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOV,QVWHDGWKHJRYHUQ-­
ment  attempted  to  promote  coordination  and  cooperation  of  
numerous   aid   agencies   through   the   Basic   Law   on   Interna-­
tional  Development  Cooperation  of  2010.  This   law  requires  
the   government   to   designate   controlling   aid   agencies   for  
grants  and  loans,  respectively,  for  a  coherent  legal  and  policy  
framework,   and   prepare   a   mid-­term   aid   plan   and   annual  
implementation   programs,   for   coordinated   and   cooperated  
DLGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQSURJUDPVDQGSURMHFWV
7KH %DVLF /DZ GHVLJQDWHG 02)$7 0LQLVWU\ RI )RUHLJQ  
$IIDLUVDQG7UDGHDVWKHFRQWUROOLQJDJHQF\IRUDOOJUDQWDLG
DJHQFLHVDQG026)0LQLVWU\RI6WUDWHJ\DQG)LQDQFHIRU
loan   aid   agencies.  The   controlling   agencies   are   responsible  
for  coordination,  monitoring  and  supervision,  and  support  of  
other  aid  agencies,  especially   the   thirty-­plus  grant  agencies.  
In  addition,   the  Basic  Law  elevates   the  existing  Committee  
on   International   Development   Cooperation   as   the   apex  
agency  for  deliberation  and  coordination  of  all  aid  agencies  
and  programs.  
$W SUHVHQW WKHUH LV QR FRQVHQVXV RQ ZKHWKHU WKH 2(&'¶V  
2008  recommendation  as  implemented  in  the  Basic  Law  was  
appropriate  for  Korea.  A  single,  overarching  ODA  law  was  not  
universally  adopted  by  DAC  member  countries.  At  that  time,  
only  twelve  of  twenty-­two  members  adopted  such  legislation;;  
the   other   ten   used   only   fundamental   policy   documents   for  
managing  ODA.  Seven  of  those  twelve  members  having  such  
legislation   also   prepared   and   used   a   fundamental   policy  
GRFXPHQW6RKQ
While   it   is   clear   that   the  Basic   Law   has   contributed   to   the  
coordination   and   regulation   of   Korean   ODA   efforts,   the  
OHJLVODWLRQDOVRKDVDSRWHQWLDOGRZQVLGH3ULRU WR
Korea   had   several   laws   on  ODA  activities,   including   the  
RUJDQLF ODZV IRU('&) .2,&$ DQG.2),+
.RUHD )RXQGDWLRQ IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +HDOWK  ZKLFK
together  provided  legal  authority  and  responsibility  to  handle  
about  80  percent  of  total  bilateral  ODA  in  Korea.  These  laws  
RXWOLQHG WZR VLPSOH DQG FOHDU 2'$ REMHFWLYHV HFRQRPLF
development   of   recipient   countries   and   mutual   exchanges.  
+RZHYHU WKH %DVLF /DZ OLVWV HLJKW DGGLQJ VXFK REMHFWLYHV
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DV UHVROXWLRQ RI JOREDO GHYHORSPHQW LVVXHV SURPRWLRQ RI  
human   rights   for   women   and   children;;   gender   equality;;  
achievement  of  humanitarianism;;  improvement  of  developing  
countries’   institutions   and   systems;;   and   contribution   to  
global   peace   and   prosperity.   Therefore,   one   risk   that   the  
Basic  Law   poses   is   that   it   may   provide   a   legal   basis   for  
the  proliferation  of  new  agencies   to  specialize   in  some  of  
WKHVL[DGGLWLRQDODLGREMHFWLYHVSRWHQWLDOO\FRPSOLFDWLQJ  
rather   than   easing  Korea’s   efforts   to   reduce   proliferation   of  
aid   agencies   and   coordinate   their   ODA   initiatives.   Another  
problem   with   the   law   is   that   it   does   not   give   any   sense   of  
SULRULW\ DPRQJ WKH GLYHUVL¿HG REMHFWLYHV IRU DLG UHVRXUFH  
allocation  and  execution.  
Coordination and Cooperation Mechanisms
In   accordance  with   the  Basic  Law,   the   controlling   and  other  
aid   agencies   collaborated   to   prepare   the  Aid   Modernization  
6WUDWHJ\3DSHU2I¿FHRI3ULPH0LQLVWHUDQG)LYH<HDU
$LG3ODQ2I¿FHRI3ULPH0LQLVWHU7KLVSODQ
provided   a   basis   for   preparing   annual   aid   implementation  
programs,  the  country  assistance  strategy  for  priority  recipient  
countries,   and   the  volume  and  grant   elements  of   total  ODA.  
Therefore,  it  indirectly  enhanced  aid  predictability  for  all  stake-­
holders   and   aid   coordination   among   domestic   aid   agencies,  





$QQXDO$LG ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ 3URJUDP $$,3 WULHV WR HQVXUH
coordination  and  cooperation  among  all  aid  agencies  and  pro-­
JUDPV DQG FRQVLVWHQF\ EHWZHHQ WKH )LYH<HDU 3ODQ DQG WKH  
annual   aid   budget.   Before   2008,   there   was   no   planning  
and   management   instrument   to   ascertain   coordination   and  
coherence   among   programs   of   almost   forty   aid   agencies,  
and  monitor  and  evaluate  their  implementation.  
7KH$$,3LVVLPLODUWRWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO$VVLVWDQFH(QYHORSH
System   in  Canada,   under  which   all   aid   related   agencies   and  
the  budget  authority  work  together  to  determine  priorities  and  
annual  budget  proposals  for  all  aid  agencies  within  the  budget  
HQYHORSHJLYHQE\WKH0LQLVWU\RI)LQDQFH2(&'
+RZHYHU .RUHD¶V $$,3 GRHV QRW IXQFWLRQ OLNH &DQDGD¶V  
system  since  it  is  put  into  effect  in  several  sequential  steps  by  
aid   implementing   agencies,   the   controlling   agencies,   and  
the   Committee   on   International   Development   Cooperation.  
Moreover,  the  program  has  no  binding  effects  on  the  Ministry  
of   Finance   since   it   is   prepared   only   by   aid-­related   agencies  
without  an  aid  budget  envelope.  To  enhance  aid  predictability  
DQGFRQVLVWHQF\ZLWKWKH)LYH<HDU3ODQ.RUHDVKRXOGWU\WR  
LQFOXGHLQ WKH$$,3DW OHDVWDQ LQGLFDWLYHDLGDPRXQWIRU WKH
next  two  years,  as  has  been  done  by  more  than  half  the  DAC  
PHPEHUVWDWHVLQWKHLUDQQXDOEXGJHWV2(&'.  
Country Partnership Strategies
For  each  priority  aid  recipient  country,  Korea  is  committed  to  
SUHSDUH D &RXQWU\ 3DUWQHUVKLS 6WUDWHJ\ &36 DQG XSGDWH LW  
every   three   years.   Currently   there   are   twenty-­six   priority  
countries.   By   the   end   of   2011,   strategies   for   three   countries  
had  been  completed,  with  half  of  the  remaining  scheduled  for  
completion  in  2012  and  the  other  half  in  2013.  
3UHSDUDWLRQRIWKH&36LVDJUHDWVWULGHIRUZDUGIRUUHFLSLHQWV¶
aid   predictability   and   coordination   among   diverse   Korean  
aid   agencies.  Before  2008,   there  were  numerous  cases  of  over-­
ODSSLQJRUFRQÀLFWLQJDLGSURJUDPVRUSURMHFWVDPRQJQXPHURXV  
Korean  aid  agencies  in  each  recipient  country.  There  were  also  
unbalanced   or   inequitable   aid   programs   between   recipient  
FRXQWULHV VLQFH HDFK RI WKH WZRPDMRU DLG DJHQFLHV .2,&$
DQG ('&) SUHSDUHG WKHLU RZQ FRXQWU\ DVVLVWDQFH VWUDWHJ\
and   aid   programs   operated   without   any   strategy   documents  
for  many  recipient  countries.  Although  there  had  been  efforts  
to  prepare  a  single  assistance  strategy  paper  for  a  particular  
recipient  country  before  2008,  these  simply  combined  KOICA  
DQG('&)GRFXPHQWVZLWKRXW D FRKHUHQW DVVLVWDQFH VWUDWHJ\  
RU SURJUDP DV SRLQWHG RXW E\ WKH  2(&' 6SHFLDO  
Review  Report.  
&XUUHQWO\ WKH&36GRFXPHQWV DUHÀDZHG LQ WKDW WKH\FRQWDLQ
only   strategy   and   lack   any   implementation   program   over   a  
three-­year  period.  Therefore,   the  documents  do  not  provide  as  
much   aid   predictability   to   stakeholders   as   they   could.  Nor   do  
they  provide  any  guidance  for  the  preparation  of  the  Annual  Aid  
,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ3URJUDPRUDQQXDOEXGJHWV0RUHRYHUWKH&36
system  does  not  solve  the  problem  of  aid  coordination  and  coop-­
eration  among  aid  agencies,  especially  Korea’s  numerous  grant  





have  yet  been  provided  for  the  division  of  labor  or  specialization  
among  more  than  thirty  grant  aid  agencies.  
Selection of Recipients and Aid  
Allocation Criteria
7KH6SHFLDO5HYLHZ5HSRUW2(&'UHFRPPHQGHGWKDW
Korea  should  pay  more  attention  to  aid  for  the  least  developed  
/'&VDQGRWKHUORZLQFRPHGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV/,&VDQG
should  clarify  the  criteria  for  selecting  recipient  countries,  al-­
locating  aid  transparently  among  countries.  To  assess  the  prog-­
UHVVPDGHVLQFHWKH2(&'UHSRUWLWLVXVHIXOWRUHYLHZ.RUHD¶V
aid  allocations  by  recipient’s  income  level,  region,  and  sector.  
Aid Allocation by Income Level
2QHRIWKHPRVWFULWLFDOO\UHYLHZHGLVVXHVE\WKH2(&'WHDP
in  2008  was  Korea’s  aid  allocation  by  recipient’s  income  level.  
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The   review  criticized  Korea’s  allocation  of  grants   and   loans,  
which   went   against   generally   agreed   upon   international   aid  
policies,   such   as   poverty   reduction   or   achievement   of   the  
0LOOHQQLXP 'HYHORSPHQW *RDOV 0'* 7KH FULWLFLVP LV  
VXPPDUL]HG DV IROORZV XVLQJ WKH .2,&$ DQG ('&) DLG  
only,  which   accounted   for   about   80  percent   of   total   bilateral  
ODA  during  2005-­07.  
)LUVW .2,&$ DQG ('&) DOORFDWHG RQO\  SHUFHQW RI  
WRWDO ELODWHUDO DLG WR WKH OHDVW GHYHORSHG /'&V DQG  
RWKHU ORZ LQFRPH FRXQWULHV /,&V ZHOO EHORZ WKH '$&  
average   of   44   percent.   At   the   same   time,   the   agencies  
DOORFDWHGSHUFHQW RI WRWDO ELODWHUDO DLG WRPLGGOH LQFRPH
FRXQWULHV0,&V




Korea   allocated   grants   to   LMICs,   which   have   relatively  
greater  capacities  to  repay  debts,  but  provided  loans  to  LDCs  
and  LICs,  which  generally  have  weaker  capacities   to  service  
debts.  Such  aid  allocation  policies  were  not  only  inequitable,  
EXW DOVR ZRXOG MHRSDUGL]H GHEW VXVWDLQDELOLW\ LQ /'&V DQG  
LICs,  and  would  risk  the  achievement  of  the  MDGs.  Such  aid  
allocation  practices  were  indicative  of  Korea’s  lack  of  a  coherent  
or  integrated  aid  framework  and  policies  at  a  national  level.  
However,   during   the   period   2008-­10,   Korea   has   shown  
VWDUNO\FOHDUFKDQJHVLQDLGDOORFDWLRQSUDFWLFHVUHÀHFWLQJWKH
2(&'¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV)LUVWRI WKH WRWDOELODWHUDODLGE\  
.2,&$DQG('&)DLGWR/'&VDQG/,&VLQFUHDVHGIURP  
percent  during  2005-­07  to  43  percent  during  2008-­10,  which  
is   nearly   the   same   level   as   the   DAC   average.  Aid   to  MICs  
GHFUHDVHGIURPSHUFHQW WRSHUFHQWZLWKDLG WR/0,&V
in   particular   seeing   a  drop.  Second,   of   the   total  KOICA  and  
('&)DLGJLYHQWR/'&V WKHVKDUHRI ORDQVGHFUHDVHGIURP  
 SHUFHQW WR  SHUFHQW DQG WKH VKDUH RI JUDQWV URVH IURP  
37  percent   to  55  percent,   a   change   that   likely   contributed   to  
poverty   reduction   and   achievement   of   the   MDGs.   Such  
FKDQJHVDUHGXHWRSROLF\VKLIWVE\WKH.2,&$DQG('&)DVZHOO  
DVFRRUGLQDWLRQHIIRUWVPDGHE\WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VRI¿FHDQG  
the  Committee  on  International  Development  Cooperation.  
Aid Allocation by Region
'XULQJ  WKH ELODWHUDO 2'$ E\ .2,&$ DQG ('&)  
focused   on  Asia   by   allocating   35   percent   of   total   aid.   The  
2(&'¶V 6SHFLDO 5HYLHZ 5HSRUW  FDOOHG WKH SUDFWLFH  
understandable,   which   is   to   be   expected   since   the   DAC  
recommended   a   focus   and   concentration   in   aid   allocations.  
'XULQJ  WKH ELODWHUDO 2'$ E\ .2,&$ DQG ('&)  
allocated   55   percent   of   aid   to   Asia.   KOICA’s   aid   to   Asia  
SHUFHQWDOPRVWDWWDLQHGWKH0LGWHUP2'$3ODQ
goal  for  grant  aid  of  50  percent.  
Korea  also  increased  its  aid  to  high-­poverty-­rate  Africa,  from  
13   percent   to   15   percent   of   total   bilateral   aid.   KOICA’s   aid  
SHUFHQWDOPRVWDWWDLQHGWKHJUDQWDLGJRDORIVHW LQ
WKH0LGWHUP2'$3ODQ.RUHD¶VDLG WR$IULFDZDVH[SHFWHG  
to   increase  sharply  since   the  country  announced   its   Initiative  
IRU$IULFD'HYHORSPHQW LQZLWK WKH DLPRI WULSOLQJDLG
to   that   continent   by   2008.  Although   the   goal   was   not   quite  




Korean ODA Average (2005-2007) DAC average  
(2005-2007)
KOICA (grant) EDCF (loan) Total
$ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) %
Least  
Developed












5 2.2 26 15.8 31 8.0 4,220 4
16 84 100
Unallocated 29 13.0 6 3.8 36 9.1 24,091 22.5
Total 225 100.0 165.0 100.0 390 100.0 106,680 100.0
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7KH 2(&' 6SHFLDO 5HYLHZ 5HSRUW UHFRPPHQGHG WKDW  
Korea   give   adequate   consideration   to   the   aid   policies   and  
practices  of  other  numerous  and  active  donors  in  Africa  and  to  
the   relatively   high   income   level   and   low   poverty   rates   in  
Latin  America.  In  fact,  Korean  aid  to  Latin  America  increased  
IURP  SHUFHQW WR  SHUFHQW RI WRWDO ELODWHUDO DLG GXULQJ
the   two   periods   compared.  However,  KOICA   provided   only  
11   percent   of   its   total   aid   to   Latin  America,   which   is  much  
ORZHUWKDQWKHJRDOIRUJUDQWDLGWRWKHUHJLRQSHUFHQWVHW
LQ WKH0LGWHUP2'$3ODQ7KLVPHDQV WKDW WKH LQFUHDVH LQ
aid   to  Latin  America,   the   relatively  high   income  region,  was  
PDGH PDLQO\ E\ ('&) ORDQV DQG ZDV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH  
2(&'UHFRPPHQGDWLRQ
.RUHDQDLGLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWGLGQRWPHHWLWVJRDOV.2,&$
DQG ('&) ZHUH WDVNHG ZLWK SURYLGLQJ  PLOOLRQ HDFK
LQJUDQWDQG ORDQDLG WR ,UDTXQGHU WKH0LGWHUP2'$3ODQ  
However,  the  two  agencies  fell  far  short  of  this  target.
Aid Allocation by Sector
7KH 2(&' 6SHFLDO 5HYLHZ 5HSRUW  UHFRPPHQGHG
that  Korea’s  aid  should  focus  on  two-­to-­three  sectors  in  each  
recipient  country,  taking  into  account  the  aid  provided  by  other  
donors   in   the   same   country   and   the   comparative   advantage  
of   Korean   aid   in   those   sectors.   The   special   report   pointed  
out   that   Korea   tended   to   spread   its   relatively   small   amount  
of  total  aid  too  thinly  across  many  countries  and  sectors.
However,   during   2008-­10,   Korea’s   aid   allocation   by   sector  
failed  to  make  progress.  Korea  offered  aid  to  all  countries  and  
sectors   covered   by   other  DAC  member   states.   For   example,  
Table  2 .RUHDDQG'$&$LG$OORFDWLRQE\5HFLSLHQWV¶,QFRPH/HYHOQHW2'$
Countries
Korean ODA Average (2008-2010)* DAC average  
(2008-2010)*
KOICA EDCF Total
$ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) %
Least  
Developed












6 1.7 42 15.0 48 7.7 7,832 6.1
12 88
Unallocated 47 13.9 5 1.7 51 8.3 37,646 29.2
Total 336 100.0 279 100.0 616 100.0 128,657 100.0
on   the  one  hand,  KOICA  offered  grant   aid   for   seven   sectors  
on   average   in   each   of   some   sixty   ordinary   partner   countries  
and  for   the  multi-­sector  at  a   rate  much  higher   than   the  DAC  
DYHUDJHSHUFHQWYHUVXVSHUFHQW2QWKHRWKHUKDQGLWRI-­
IHUHGQRDLGIRUWKHSURJUDPVHFWRUVVHFWRURUEXGJHWVXSSRUWV
and  reduced  humanitarian  sector  aid  from  7  percent  to  4  per-­
cent,  which  is  much  smaller  than  the  8  percent  DAC  average.  
During  2008-­10,  social-­administrative  infrastructure  sector  aid  
made  up  42  percent  of  total  Korean  ODA,  which  is  somewhat  
KLJKHU WKDQ WKH'$&DYHUDJH SHUFHQW+RZHYHUGXULQJ
the   same  period,   economic   infrastructure   sector  aid  made  up  
32  percent  of   total  Korean  ODA,  which   is  much  higher   than  
WKH'$&DYHUDJH  SHUFHQW7KHVH UHVXOWVPD\ EH GXH LQ  
SDUWWRWKHSHFXOLDUDLGSROLFLHVLQ.RUHD('&)ORDQVZKLFK  
share  a  greater  part  of  total  bilateral  aid  relative  to  other  DAC  
member  states,  focus  on  economic  infrastructure.  However,  KO-­
ICA’s  grant  aid  also  covers  economic  infrastructure  at  18  percent  
RILWVWRWDO/LNHZLVH('&)¶VORDQVDOVRDOORFDWHDKLJKVKDUH  
to  social-­administrative  infrastructure  at  40  percent  of  its  total.  
Aid  for  economic  infrastructure  contributes  more  effectively  
to  economic  growth  in  a  shorter  period,  while  aid  for  social-­
administrative   services   contributes   to   economic   growth  
over  a  relatively  longer  period  of  time,  but  more  effectively  
LPSURYHVZHOIDUHRI WKHSRRU LQ WKHVKRUWUXQ5DGHOHWHWDO
7KHUHIRUHORDQVPD\IRFXVPRUHRQDLGIRUHFRQRPLF
infrastructure   to  generate   funds   to  be  used   for   repaying   the  
loans   in   a   shorter   period,  while   grants  may   concentrate   on  
aid  for  social-­administrative  infrastructure  and  services.  
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Table  3 .RUHDDQG'$&$LG$OORFDWLRQE\5HJLRQQHW2'$
Region
Korean ODA Average (2005-2007)
DAC average  
(2005-2007)
KOICA EDCF Total
$ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) %
Africa
27 12.1 24 14.6 51 13.1 39,257 36.8
53 47 100
Asia




21 9.1 11 7.0 32 8.2 6,885 6.5
66 34 100
Middle East
64 28.4 11 6.6 75 19.2 17,713 16.6
85 15 100
Oceania
1 0.3 - - 1 0.2 1,217 1.1
100.0 - 100 100
Europe
8 3.5 15 9.2 23 5.9 4,418 4.1
35 65 100
Unallocated 29 12.8 6 3.8 35 9.0 16,915 15.9
Total 225 100.0 165 100.0 390 100.0 106,680 100.0
Table  4 .RUHDDQG'$&$LG$OORFDWLRQE\5HJLRQQHW2'$
Region
Korean ODA Average (2008-2010)
DAC average  
(2008-2010)
KOICA EDCF Total
$ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) % $ (million) %
Africa
59 17.4 34 12.2 93 15.0 46,971 36.5
63 37 100
Asia




36 10.8 24 8.7 61 9.8 9,707 7.5
59 41 100
Middle East
19 5.8 5 1.9 25 4.0 13,263 10.3
23 77 100
Oceania
- - - - - - 1,704 1.3
Europe
19 5.6 28 10.1 47 7.7 5,608 4.5
40 60 100
Unallocated 47 13.8 5 1.7 51 8.3 24,967 19.4
Total 336 100.0 279 100.0 616 100.0 128,657 100.0
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By  allocating   their  aid  according   to   recipients’   income   level,  
.2,&$¶VJUDQWVDQG('&)¶VORDQVPDGHSURJUHVVLQLPSURY-­
ing  their  division  of  labor  and  specialization.  Likewise,  these  
aid   agencies   need   to   work   more   on   allocating   their   aid   by  
sector   as   well.   In   particular,   the   numerous   aid   agencies  
offering   grants   should   develop   a   clear   division   of   labor   and  
specialization  among  themselves.  The  Committee  on  Interna-­
tional  Development  Cooperation  and  MOFAT,  the  controlling  
and   coordinating   agencies   for   grant   aid,   should   take   up   the  
challenge  rigorously.
An Econometric Analysis of Aid  
Allocation Criteria
7KH 2(&' 6SHFLDO 5HYLHZ 5HSRUW  DUJXHG WKDW  
Korea’s  aid   recipients  were   too  numerous  and   that   the  criteria  
for   selecting   recipients   and   allocating   aid   were   unclear.   In  
2008,   the  number  of   recipients   reached  129  countries,  which  
ZHUHGLYLGHGDPRQJWKUHHJURXSVSULRULW\RUGLQDU\DQGRWKHU  
recipients.  The  priority  recipients  included  nineteen  countries  
LQWKH.2,&$OLVWDQGHOHYHQFRXQWULHVLQWKH('&)OLVW+RZ-­
ever,  seven  priority  countries  were  common  to  both  lists,  and  
therefore  there  were  a  total  of  twenty-­three  priority  countries.  
Both  the  criteria  for  selecting  those  countries  and  the  criteria  
for  allocating  aid  to  those  three  groups  of  countries  were  un-­
FOHDU$OWKRXJKWKH0LGWHUP2'$3ODQLQGLFDWHVWKDWSULRULW\
countries  were   those  with  Korean  embassies,   the   list   included  
some  priority  recipient  countries  without  a  Korean  ambassador.  
The   Basic   Law   of   2010   indicates   that   the   priority   countries  
are  basically  the  LDCs,  but  there  are  many  non-­LDCs  on  the  
list.  The  difference  between  the  ordinary  and  other  recipients  
is  also  unclear.  
During   the   period   2008-­10,   there   was   little   progress   in  
reducing  the  number  of  recipients  and  clarifying  the  criteria  
for   electing   countries   and   allocating   aid   to   them.  However,  
IHZ '$& PHPEHU FRXQWULHV KDYH FODUL¿HG WKH FRXQWU\  
VHOHFWLRQ RU DLG GLVWULEXWLRQ FULWHULD H[FHSW SHUKDSV WKH  
0LOOHQQLXP&KDOOHQJH&RUSRUDWLRQRIWKH86(YHQZKHQ
some   member   countries   declared   their   policies   or   criteria,  
there  were  substantial  gaps  between   the  announced  policies  
DQG DFWXDO SUDFWLFH $OHVLQD DQG 'ROODU $OHVLQD DQG
:HGHU(DVWHUO\DQG3IXW]H
6RPH UHFHQWHPSLULFDO VWXGLHVRI WKHGDWDGXULQJ WKHV DQG
WKURXJK LQGLFDWH WKDW'$&PHPEHUV LQFUHDVLQJO\ VHOHFWHG




Korean ODA Average (2005-2007)
DAC average 
 (2005-2007)KOICA EDCF Total








51 22.5 84 50.9 135 34.5 12,374 11.6
38 62 100
Production
11 4.7 12 7.1 22 5.7 5,654 5.3
50 50 100
Multi-sector
33 14.9 1 0.4 34 8.8 6,934 6.5
97 3 100
Program
- - - - - - 3,520 3.3
Humanitarian





3 1.5 8 4.6 11 2.8 31,790 29.8
27 73 100
Total 225 100.0 165 100.0 390 100.0 106,680 100.0
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Berthelemy  and  Ticher  2004;;  Claessens,  et  al  2007;;  Bandyo-­
SDGK\D\DQG:DOO7KDWLV'$&PHPEHUVLQFUHDVLQJO\
allocated  more   aid   to   those   developing   countries  with   lower  
per-­capita   income,   greater   needs   for   human   capital   develop-­
ment,  sounder  political  and  economic  policies  and  institutions,  
and  a  larger  number  of  poor  people.  However,  the  studies  did  
not   reveal  consistent   results,  and   the  estimation  models  were  
fraught  with  defects  or  weaknesses.  Therefore,  this  paper  makes  
an  empirical  analysis,  overcoming   the  defects  of   the  past  es-­
timation   models,   and   using   data   on   157   recipient   countries  
and   twenty-­three   donor   countries   during   the   period   2005-­10  
$QQH[  7KH DQDO\VLV DLPV WR FRQ¿UP ZKHWKHU '$&  
member   states,   including  Korea,  provided  ODA  in  a  manner  
consistent  with  the  optimum  aid  allocation  model  for  poverty  
UHGXFWLRQ&ROOLHUDQG'ROODU
The  generalized  least  square  model  with  heteroskedasticity  to  













recipient  countries’  developmental  needs  and  donor    
countries’  economic  interests  in  offering  aid  to  recipients  
LHSHUFDSLWDLQFRPHDQGLWVVTXDUHGYDOXHLQIDQW
PRUWDOLW\UDWHDQGLWVVTXDUHGYDOXHLQGH[RIFLYLOULJKWV
participation  rights,  index  of  government  effectiveness,  
size  of  population  and  its  squared  number,  imports  from  
the  donor  and  its  squared  value,  exports  to  the  donor  
and  its  squared  value,  foreign  direct  investment  from  the  
GRQRUDQGLWVVTXDUHGYDOXH
Estimation of DAC Members’ Aid  
Allocation Criteria
The   results   of   the   analysis   conducted   for   twenty-­two   DAC  




Korean ODA Average (2008-2010)*
DAC average  
(2008-2010)*KOICA EDCF Total








60 17.9 136 48.5 196 31.8 21,550 16.75
31 69 100
Production
30 9.1 27 9.5 57 9.3 9,135 7.1
53 47 100
Multi-sector
60 17.9 2 0.6 62 10.1 11,836 9.2
97 3 100
Program
- - - - - 5,403 4.2
Humanitarian





24 7.2 5 1.9 30 4.8 20,585 16
80 20 100
Total 336 100.0 279 100.0 616 100.0 128,657 100.0
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those  countries  with  lower  per-­capita  real  income  and  a  larger  
population.  However,  the  aid  level  was  in  a  negative  relation-­
ship  with  the  civil  rights  and  government  effectiveness  levels.  
0RUHRYHU WKHQHHGIRUKXPDQFDSLWDOGHYHORSPHQWUHÀHFWHG
in  such  measures  as  the  infant  mortality  rate,  was  not  seriously  
considered.   Such   practice   contravenes   the   optimum   aid   al-­
location  model.  On  the  other  hand,  DAC  member  states  also  
seriously   considered   their   own   economic   interests   in   actual  
aid  allocation  practice.  More  aid  went   to   those  countries   that  
import   more   from   and   export   more   to   the   donor   country,  
DOWKRXJK LQYHVWPHQW LQ WKH DLG UHFLSLHQW FRXQWULHV )', GLG  
QRWVKRZDUHODWLRQVKLSDWDVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWOHYHO
Estimation of Korea’s Aid Allocation Criteria
The  same  model  was  applied   to   the   total  aid  by  KOICA  and  
('&)GXULQJWKHSHULRGVDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\WR
ascertain  any  progress  made  toward  the  optimum  aid  allocation  
model  for  poverty  reduction.
The   results   indicate   that   the   total   aid   allocation   by   Korea  
PDGHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWSURJUHVVWRZDUGWKHRSWLPXPDLG  
allocation   model   between   the   two   periods   compared  
$QQH['XULQJWKH0LGWHUP2'$SODQSHULRG  
Korea  provided  more  aid  to  countries  with  lower  per-­capita  real  
income,  higher   infant  mortality  rates,  and  a  larger  number  of  
the  population.  Moreover,  more  aid  was  provided  to  countries  
with   higher   levels   of   government   effectiveness.   However,  
total   aid   allocation   by   Korea   during   this   period   did   not  
consider   the   civil   rights   level,  which  was  well   considered   in  
the  previous  2005-­07  period.  
On   the  other  hand,  Korea’s   total   aid   allocation   in  2008-­10  did  
not  consider  national   interests,   as  was   the  case   in   the  previous  
period.   Imports   from   the   recipient  countries  and  exports   to   the  
UHFLSLHQWVGLGQRWKDYHDQ\VWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQW LQÀXHQFHRQ  
aid   amount   to   recipients.   This   situation   goes   well   for   the  
modernization   of  Korea’s   aid   system.  However,   it   contravenes  
WKH GRPHVWLF PDQGDWHV JLYHQ WR .2,&$ DQG ('&) VLQFH  
their   organic   laws,   as   well   as   the   Basic   Law   on   International  
Development   Cooperation,   stipulate   that   they   should   pursue  
the   economic  development  of   recipient   countries   and   “mutual  
exchanges  and  friendships”  at  the  same  time.  
2Q DYHUDJH RWKHU '$& PHPEHU VWDWHV VLJQL¿FDQWO\ IROORZ
WKHLUQDWLRQDOPDQGDWHVZKLFKDUHRIWHQVSHFL¿HGDVWKHLUDLG
aim   in   either   their   laws   or   basic   policy   documents,   such   as  
³PXWXDO EHQH¿WV´ HJ 1HWKHUODQGV ³QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\´ RU
³IRUHLJQSROLF\REMHFWLYHV´HJ867KHVHH[DPSOHVSRLQW
to  the  difference  between  development  assistance  by  the  private  
VHFWRUFRUSRUDWLRQV1*2VSKLODQWKURSLFRUJDQL]DWLRQVHWF
DQGRI¿FLDOGHYHORSPHQWDVVLVWDQFHE\JRYHUQPHQWVDQGJRYHUQ-­
mental  organizations.  Korea   should   strive   to   strike   a  balance  
EHWZHHQWKHFRPSHWLQJREMHFWLYHVRI2'$DVRWKHUDGYDQFHG
DAC  member  governments  have  done.
Multilateral Aid Allocation
Korea  maintained  about  30  percent  of   its   total  ODA  for  multi-­  
lateral  aid,  i.e.,  non-­earmarked  contributions  to  intergovernmental  
organizations,   as   other   DAC   member   states   did.   While   this  
VKDUHZDVRQO\SHUFHQW LQ LW URVHVKDUSO\ WRDERXW  
percent  on  average  during  2007-­10,  although  the  share  declined  
WR  SHUFHQW LQ  .RUHD HYHQ MRLQHG WKH 0XOWLODWHUDO  
2UJDQL]DWLRQV3HUIRUPDQFH$VVHVVPHQW1HWZRUN023$1ZLWK
other  DAC  members  in  2008.  
As  in  bilateral  ODA,  the  most  critical  issue  in  multilateral  aid  
for  Korea  is  a  lack  of  a  coherent  allocation  mechanism.  During  
2005-­07,  more   than   twenty   government  ministries,   including  
the  MOFAT,   allocated   aid   to   some   eighty   inter-­governmental  
organizations.  Korea  has  contemplated  establishing  a  guideline  
for   cooperating  with   international   organizations,   since  minis-­
tries  and  government  agencies  were  aiding  numerous   interna-­
tional   organizations  with  overlapping   small   contributions   and  
programs.  However,  the  government  has  not  yet  developed  any  
overarching   and   coherent   strategy   document   to   set   priorities  
DPRQJFRPSHWLQJREMHFWLYHVDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQV
Conclusions and Future Challenges
This  paper  aims  to  assess  the  progress  made  in  ODA  manage-­
PHQWE\.RUHDVLQFHLWH[SUHVVHGLWVLQWHUHVWLQMRLQLQJWKH'$&
in  2008.  Since  the  topic  to  be  covered  is  so  broad,  this  paper  
focuses  on  those  issues  and  problems  most  critically  reviewed  
E\ WKH2(&'6SHFLDO5HYLHZ5HSRUW RI 7KH\ FDQ EH
summarized  as  the  scale  and  terms  of  aid,  and  a  lack  of  a  coher-­
ent  aid  management  framework  and  aid  allocation  criteria.  
Regarding  the  scale  and  terms  of  aid,  Korea  has  made  satisfac-­
tory  progress  since  2008.  While  total  government  expenditure  
rose  by  7  percent  per  year,  total  aid  increased  by  29  percent  per  
year.  Based  on  this  trend,  it   is  expected  that  Korea  will  most  
likely  attain  its  promised  net  ODA  goal  of  0.25  percent  of  GNI  
by  2015  and  terms  of  ODA  commitments  comparable  to  those  
of  other  DAC  member  states.
$V WR WKH QHHG IRU D XQL¿HG DQG FRKHUHQW DLG IUDPHZRUN
encompassing   all   aid   agencies   and   programs,   substantial  
progress  has  been  made  since  2008.  The  Basic  Law  on  Inter-­  
QDWLRQDO 'HYHORSPHQW &RRSHUDWLRQ  PDQGDWHG WKDW  
.RUHD IRUPXODWH DQ LQWHJUDWHG )LYH<HDU$LG 3ODQ DQG WKH  
$QQXDO $LG ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ 3ODQ 7KH &RPPLWWHH RQ  
,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'HYHORSPHQW &RRSHUDWLRQ OHG E\ WKH 3ULPH
Minister,   was   designated   as   the   apex   agency   for   delibera-­
tion   and   coordination   of   all   ODA   related   matters,   and   the  
MOFAT   and   MOSF   assumed   the   responsibilities   for  
monitoring,   coordinating,   and   supporting  all   grant   and   loan  
aid  agencies  and  programs,  respectively.  A  new  list  of  twenty-­
six  priority  aid  recipients,  which  is  common  to  both  grant  and  
loan  aid  programs,  was  drawn  up,  and  an  integrated  country  
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partnership  strategy  document  was  prepared  for  each  of  three  
priority   recipients   in   consultation   with   all   stakeholders.  
However,   the  documents  contain  only  strategy;;  an   integrated  
implementation   program   covering   three-­year   aid   activities  
of   all   grant   and   loan   programs   per   country   has   yet   to   be  
prepared   and   included   in   each   of   the   strategy   document.  
Moreover,  the  linkage  between  this  country  partnership  strategy  
GRFXPHQW DQG WKH$QQXDO$LG ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ 3URJUDP DV  
well  as  the  annual  budget  proposal  should  be  established  and  
strengthened  over  time.
Although  clear  policies  and  criteria  for  selecting  aid  recipient  
countries   and   allocating   aid   have   not   been   announced  
\HW JUDQWORDQ FRRUGLQDWLRQ LQ DOORFDWLQJ DLG E\ UHFLSLHQW  
countries’   per   capita   income   and   region   has   substantially  
improved  during  the  2008-­10  period.  Contrary  to  the  earlier  
period   of   2005-­07,   grant   aid   tends   to   focus   on   the   least  
developed  or  lower  income  countries,  while  loan  aid  focuses  
more  on  middle   income  countries.  However,  a  coordination  
challenge  still  remains  in  allocating  aid  by  country  and  sector.  
The  challenge  of  clarifying  the  criteria  for  division  of   labor  
or   specialization   by   sector   at   each   recipient   country  
level   still   remains   between   grant   and   loan   aid   agencies,   in  
particular  among  more  than  thirty  grant  aid  agencies.  More-­  
over,  Korea  still  tries  to  spread  a  small  amount  of  total  aid  too  
thinly   across   some   130   developing   countries.   The   total  
number   of   recipient   countries   may   not   be   easily   reduced.  
+RZHYHU WKH PDMRU DLG DJHQFLHV OLNH .2,&$ DQG ('&)  
should   concentrate   mainly   on   delivering   aid   to   priority  
and   ordinary   recipient   countries,   and   aid   for   the   rest   of  
the  countries  should  be  relegated  to  other  numerous  public  aid  
agencies  and  private  sector  aid  agencies  like  corporations  and  
1*2V(YHQIRUWKHSULRULW\DQGRUGLQDU\UHFLSLHQWFRXQWULHV
DFKDOOHQJHUHPDLQVLQUHÀHFWLQJWKH³%XVDQ3DUWQHUVKLSIRU
(IIHFWLYH 'HYHORSPHQW &RRSHUDWLRQ´ ZLWK RWKHU SXEOLF DLG
DJHQFLHVDQGWKHSULYDWHVHFWRURUJDQL]DWLRQV2(&'
To  estimate  the  actual  criteria  for  selecting  recipient  countries  
and   allocating   aid,   an   econometric   analysis   was   conducted  
with   an   improved   estimation   model   and   the   most   recently  
available  data.  Although  Korea’s  aid  allocation  does  not  quite  
reach   the   level   of   other   DAC   member   states,   the   country  
KDV PDGH SURJUHVV WRZDUG VHOHFWLYH RU PRGHUQL]HG DLG  
allocation.  Since  2008,   it  has  allocated  more  aid   to  countries  
with   lower   per-­capita   income,   greater   needs   for   human  
development,   a   larger   number   of   poor   people,   and   a   more  
effective   government.   However,   Korea   has   not   taken   into  
account   policies   and   political   institutions,   such   as   the  
SURPRWLRQRIFLYLOULJKWVSDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLF
interests  simultaneously.
7KH )LYH<HDU$LG 3ODQ  HPSKDVL]HV WKH QHHG WR  
tackle   these   remaining   issues   and   challenges,   but   does   not  
SURYLGH VSHFL¿F SROLFLHV RU SURJUDPV 7KH &RPPLWWHH RQ  
International   Development   Cooperation   and   monitoring  
agencies,  such  as  the  MOFAT  and  MOSF,  should  show  leader-­
VKLSDQGZRUNKDUGHUZLWKRWKHUVWDNHKROGHUVWR¿OOWKDWYRLG
Lee  Kye  Woo   is   the  Chair  Professor  of   the  Graduate  School  
of   International   and   Area   Studies   at   Hankuk   University   of  
Foreign  Studies.
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Annex  1 Sources  of  Data
Variable Source URL
ODA- DAC member OECD http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=427326
ODA- Korea KOICA http://stat.koica.go.kr:8077/komis/jsptemp/ps/stat_index.jsp
.+7+LÅH[VY World Bank http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&DisplayAggregation=
N&SdmxSupported=Y&CNO=2&SET_BRANDING=YES
GDP per capita World Bank
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&DisplayAggregation=
N&SdmxSupported=Y&CNO=2&SET_BRANDING=YES
Infant Mortality World Bank
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&DisplayAggregation=
N&SdmxSupported=Y&CNO=2&SET_BRANDING=YES
Civil Liberty &  
Political Rights
Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/templatecfm?page=25&year=2010






Export to the Donor UNCTAD http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx
Import from the Donor UNCTAD http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx
FDI from the Donor OECD http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?r=427326
FDI from Korea Korea Eximbank http://odisis.koreaexim.go.kr/fv/fvweb/login.jsp
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Annex  2 .RUHDDQG'$&5HJUHVVLRQ$QDO\VLVRI$LG$OORFDWLRQQHWELODWHUDO2'$
Dependent Variable: Aid Amount  







Recipient Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Time Dummy Y Y Y
Donor Dummy Y Y Y
Common Intercept 57.81821* (18.80) 52.67486* (3.07) 2.683334 (0.88)
Real GDP per capita -1.812406* (-5.13) 0.027868* (-24.71) (dropped)
Real GDP per capita squared 0.0775636* (4.70) 1.29E-06* (34.96) -1.14E-06* (-52.96)
Infant Mortality -0.0593616 (-0.47) 0.2771697* (5.09) 0.0318128 (0.77)
Infant Mortality squared -0.001732* (-2.21) -0.002664* (-5.17) -0.000306 (-1.04)
Civil Liberty & Political Rights -0.490909* (-3.12) 0.0021943 (0.09) 0.2347748* (3.8)
Govt. Effectiveness -1.984915* (-2.89) 1.597834* (2.51) 0.0871865 (0.38)
Population 0.3969686* (2.89) 0.0011204* (31.25) (dropped)
Population squared -0.000157 (-1.79) -2.94E-10*(-30.71) 1.33E-12* (6.20)
Real Export to the Donor 4.32E-07*(2.45) 2.14E-07 (1.23) -3.71E-07 (-1.79)
Real Export to the Donor Squared -3.90E-15* (-5.20) 5.81E-15 (0.57) 1.03E-14 (0.43)
Real Import from the Donor 1.30E-06* (4.20) -3.54E-08 (-0.2) 4.62E-07 (1.85)
Real Import from the Donor wSquared 3.77E-14* (2.46) -1.28E-15 (-0.93) -3.55E-14 (-1.26)
Real FDI from the Donor 0.0015829 (1.88) 7.94E-07 (0.19) 9.70E-07 (0.35)
Real FDI from the Donor Squared -5.84E-09 (-0.03) -8.64E-13 (-0.24) 2.22E-12* (2.29)
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KOREA’S ROLE AND THE ACHIEVEMENTS  
OF THE FOURTH HIGH LEVEL FORUM ON  
AID EFFECTIVENESS IN BUSAN
By Enna Park
Abstract
On   29   November   2011,   over   3,000   participants   gathered   in   the   bustling   city   of   Busan   to   seek   a   new   consensus   on  
DLG DQGGHYHORSPHQW7KH%XVDQ)RUXPRQ$LG(IIHFWLYHQHVV +/) UHSUHVHQWV D WXUQLQJSRLQW LQ JOREDO GHYHORSPHQW  
by   shifting   the   paradigm   from   aid   to   development   effectiveness   and   forging   a   new   global   partnership   for   development.  
7KH SURPLVH RI WKH %XVDQ 3DUWQHUVKLS ZLOO EH PHW ZKHQ WKH SROLWLFDO PRPHQWXP DQG DFWLYH SDUWLFLSDWLRQ E\ DOO  
development  stakeholders  continue.  
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Background
Three   years   ago,   in  March   2009,   the   decision   was  made   in  
3DULVWKDW.RUHDZRXOGKRVWWKHODVW+LJK/HYHO)RUXPRQ$LG  
(IIHFWLYHQHVV +/) ZLWK WKH XQDQLPRXV VXSSRUW RI DOO  
WKH PHPEHUV RI WKH :RUNLQJ 3DUW\ RQ $LG (IIHFWLYHQHVV  
:3()).RUHD¶VKRVWLQJWKHJOREDOGHYHORSPHQWHYHQWKROGV
special  meaning  in  the  history  of  development  cooperation.  
Despite   the   remarkable   economic   progress   in   emerging   and  
developing   countries,   poverty   remains   a   global   challenge.  
In  addition,  recurring  global  crises  such  as  climate  change,  food  
LQVHFXULW\DQG¿QDQFLDOLQVWDELOLW\KDYHSRVHGDJUHDWWKUHDWWR
both  developed  and  developing  countries.  
7KH GRQRU FRPPXQLW\ KDVPDGH VLJQL¿FDQW HIIRUWV LQ WHUPV  
of   expanding   the   assistance   to   developing   countries   through  
2I¿FLDO 'HYHORSPHQW$VVLVWDQFH 2'$ DQG HQKDQFLQJ WKH
TXDOLW\RIDLGZLWKDVHULHVRI2(&'OHGKLJKOHYHOIRUXPVRQ  
aid  effectiveness  starting  in  Rome  in  2003.  Yet,  the  results  of  
development  cooperation  have  been  not  fully  satisfactory.  
With   the   target   year   of   the  Millennium  Development   Goals  
0'*V DSSURDFKLQJ LQ OHVV WKDQ IRXU \HDUV WKH %XVDQ  
Forum  was  uniquely  positioned  to  take  stock  of  progress  and  
FKDOOHQJHVLQWKHSDVWDQGWRGH¿QHQHZGLUHFWLRQVLQGHYHORS-­
ment  cooperation.  In  this  context,  Korea,  as  an  exemplary  case  
of  showcasing  the  power  of  effective  aid,  offered  an  inspiriting  
setting   to   discuss   aid   effectiveness   and   to   look   beyond   the  
horizon  of  aid  toward  effective  development  cooperation.
Lessons Learned
)LYH\HDUVRILPSOHPHQWLQJWKH3DULV'HFODUDWLRQDQGDJOREDO
UHÀHFWLRQ RQ WKH FKDQJLQJ GHYHORSPHQW ODQGVFDSH KDYH OHIW  
invaluable   lessons,   putting   the   Busan   Forum   in   a   different  
context  from  previous  forums.  
As   evidenced   in   the   three-­time   monitoring   surveys   and  
independent  evaluations,  aid  effectiveness  matters  for  develop-­
ment   results.  Yet,  political  will,  especially   from  the  donor,   is  
critical  to  bring  further  progress.  The  call  for  moving  from  the  
process-­oriented,  technical  talks  to  more  focus  on  sustainable  
development  results  has  been  increasing  throughout  the  years.  
At   the   same   time,   the  global  community  needs   to  adapt   to  a  
series   of   changes   in   the   global   development   landscape.  
While   North-­South   cooperation   remains   the   mainstream  
of   development   cooperation,   developing   countries   are  
increasingly   becoming   vital   sources   of   trade,   investment,  
knowledge,  and  development  cooperation.  Moreover,  NGOs,  
global   programs,   private   funds   and   businesses   are   actively  
engaging   in  development,   providing   innovative   thinking   and  
approaches   to   development.   The   diversity   of   development  
players  and  the  expansion  of  development  resources  beyond  aid  
are  reshaping  the  global  development  architecture.  This  means  
that   the  development  agenda  set  and  led  by  donor  countries  
alone  will  no  longer  be  relevant  and  effective.  This  change  calls  
for  more  inclusive  development  partnership.  
,QDGGLWLRQDVDQ2UJDQL]DWLRQIRU(FRQRPLF&RRSHUDWLRQDQG
'HYHORSPHQW 2(&' 'HYHORSPHQW $VVLVWDQFH &RPPLWWHH
'$&&KDLUSUHYLRXVO\QRWHG WKHJOREDOGHYHORSPHQWFRP-­
munity  is  now  moving  from  “a  transactional  aid  relationship”  
to   a   “transformational   development   relationship.”  Aid   is   an  
important,  but  limited,  resource  for  development.  It  is  time  to  
deepen  the  understanding  of  development  in  a  broader  context.  
As  development  is  increasingly  intertwined  with  other  policy  
LVVXHV²VXFK DV WUDGH LQYHVWPHQW WKH HQYLURQPHQW VHFXULW\
HWF²SURPRWLQJ JUHDWHU FRKHUHQFH DPRQJ WKHVH SROLFLHV LV  
essential  to  producing  better  development  results.  
Key Achievements in Busan
Against   this   backdrop,   the   Busan   Forum   marked   a   turning  
point  in  development  cooperation  by  making  an  important  step  
forward  in  several  ways.  
Political  Discussion  on  Aid  and  Development  
The   Busan   Forum   brought   together   the   broadest   range   of  
stakeholders  in  development.  Several  heads  of  states,  over  100  
PLQLVWHUV IURP  FRXQWULHV  KHDGV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO  
organizations,  around  90  parliamentarians,  300  partners  from  
civil  society  organizations,  and  more  than  100  representatives  




of  State  Hillary  Clinton,  UN  Secretary  General  Ban  Ki-­Moon,  
DQG2(&'6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO$QJpO*XUUȓD
7KH XQSUHFHGHQWHG KLJK OHYHO RI SDUWLFLSDWLRQ UHÀHFWHG WKH  
gravity   of   responsibility   and   enthusiasm   for   the   work   they  
are  undertaking  in  Busan.  All  development  actors  represented  
in  Busan  were   tasked  with   responding   to   the   increasing   call  
for  more   effectiveness,   accountability   and,  most   importantly,  
results  of  their  efforts.  
Truly  Multi-­Stakeholder  Partnership:    
Busan’s  Contribution  to  MDG  8
Unlike  previous  forums,  the  Busan  Forum  was  attended  by  a  
large   number   of   diverse   development   actors   beyond  govern-­
ments  and  international  organizations.  With  Korea’s  leadership,  
several   multi-­stakeholders   events   were   organized   including  
WKH3DUOLDPHQWDULDQ)RUXPWKH3ULYDWH6HFWRU)RUXPDQGWKH
Youth  Forum.  Also,  prior  to  the  main  event,  the  Civil  Society  
Forum  was  organized  with  over  500  participants.  
The   Busan   Forum   recognized   these   development   actors   as  
true  partners   in  development   and   facilitated   their   substantive  
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contributions  to  the  Busan  agenda  and  the  outcome  document,  
contributing   to  realizing   the  MDG  goal  of  global  partnership  
for  development.  
From  Aid  to  Development  Effectiveness  
,WZDVZHOOQRWHGWKDWWKHUHZDVPXFK³XQ¿QLVKHGEXVLQHVV´LQ  
WKH DLG HIIHFWLYHQHVV MRXUQH\ DV RQO\ RQH RI WKLUWHHQ  
LQGLFDWRUVRIWKH3DULV'HFODUDWLRQKDGEHHQPHW,QUHVSRQVH  
the   participants   in   Busan   agreed   to   keep   the   promise   on  
aid   effectiveness   by   renewing   core   commitments   including  
transparency,   predictability,   accountability   and   agreeing   to  
monitor  progress.  
However,   deepening   the   aid   effectiveness   agenda   would  
QRWVXI¿FHWRSURPRWHVXVWDLQDEOHJURZWKDQGGHYHORSPHQWDQG
to  respond  to  the  rapidly  changing  world.  To  make  development  
happen  and  enhance  the  impact  of  cooperation,  there  is  a  need  
to  take  a  broader  approach  to  development.  Some  critics  argued  
that   Busan   was   facing   the   risk   of   being   “a   lowest-­common  
denominator  without  bite  or  focus  by  becoming  more  general  
and  inclusive”  and  diluting  the  level  of  commitment  by  donors.  
However,   sticking   to   the   previous   aid   effectiveness   agenda  
ZRXOGPDNH%XVDQHYHQOHVVVLJQL¿FDQW
To  large  extent,  Korea’s  vision  for  development  effectiveness  
was   largely  based  on   its  own  development  experience.  And  
it  was  well  supported  by  African  countries  through  the  Tunis  
Consensus.  Aid  should  be  used  as  a  catalyst  to  leverage  other  
GHYHORSPHQW ¿QDQFLQJ LQFOXGLQJ WUDGH SULYDWH LQYHVWPHQW  
and   domestic   resources.   By   doing   so,   it   can   create   the  
enabling  environment   to  realize   the  country’s  own  potential  
for  growth  and  development.  
OECD-­UN  Joint  Partnership
Another   initiative   proposed   by   Korea   was   to   forge   more  
systematic  cooperation  among  global  development  fora,  calling  
IRUDV\QHUJLFSDUWQHUVKLSEHWZHHQWKH2(&'DQGWKH8QLWHG  
1DWLRQV81IRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQWKHKLVWRU\RIJOREDOGHYHO-­
opment   cooperation.  This  proposal  was  well   received  by   the  
participants  and  incorporated  into  the  outcome  document.  
Departing   from   the  previous  process   led  by  donor   countries,  
the  Busan  Forum  demonstrated  that  developing  countries  can  
and   should   take   the   lead   in   setting   the   development   agenda.  
The  participants  also  recognized  the  role  of  the  UN  in  enhanc-­
ing  effective  development  cooperation  and  invited  the  United  
1DWLRQV 'HYHORSPHQW 3URJUDPPH 81'3 DORQJ ZLWK WKH
2(&'WRZRUN WRJHWKHU LQVXSSRUWLQJ WKHHIIHFWLYHIXQFWLRQ-­
LQJRI WKH%XVDQ3DUWQHUVKLS*LYHQ WKH81¶VXQLYHUVDOFRQ-­
YHQLQJ SRZHU DQG WKH81'3¶V ¿HOG SUHVHQFH LQ GHYHORSLQJ
FRXQWULHV LQYLWLQJ WKH 81'3 DV D FRUH SDUWQHU LV H[SHFWHG  
to   provide   greater   legitimacy   and   political   clout   to   the  
new  partnership.  
Issues and Breakthroughs 
7KH RXWFRPH GRFXPHQW %XVDQ 3DUWQHUVKLS IRU (IIHFWLYH  
Development  Cooperation,  was   the   result  of  an   inclusive  year-­
long  process  of  consultation  with  a  broad  range  of  governmental,  
civil  society,  and  private  actors  in  development.  
A   small   group  of   sherpas   representing   each   constituency  were  
responsible  for  negotiating   the  document.  Like  any  other   inter-­
national  negotiation  processes,  the  Busan  outcome  document  was  
¿QDOL]HGDIWHUDJUHDWGHDORISROLWLFDOQXGJHDQGFRPSURPLVH
Korea,  as  host  country,  played  brokering  roles  and  exerted  dip-­
lomatic  leadership  to  bridge  the  gap  of  differences  and  bring  key  
issues  into  the  consensus.  
South-­South  Cooperation  Providers  
7KH %XVDQ )RUXP PDUNHG D VLJQL¿FDQW SURJUHVV LQ HQ-­
gaging   South-­South   cooperation   partners   by   recognizing  
their   complementary   roles   and   creating   a   space   for   them  
under   the  principle  of  “common  but  differential  commitments”  
and  “voluntary  participation”  in  the  partnership.  
The  outcome’s  second  paragraph  clearly  states,  “The  principles,  
commitments   and   actions   agreed   in   the   outcome   document  
in  Busan  shall  be  the  reference  for  South-­South  partners  on  a  vol-­
untary  basis.”  
Arguably,  the  paragraph  lessened  the  overall  ambition  of  Busan  
commitments.  However,   it   is   neither   legitimate   nor   realistic   to  
apply   the   same   standards   to   South-­South   Cooperation   provid-­
ers  as  traditional  donors.  South-­South  partners  have  a  relatively  
short   history   of   development   cooperation   as   providers.   Also,  
they  remain  developing  countries  and  face  poverty  at  home.  As  
the  Mexican  sherpa  articulately  explained  during  the  negotiation,  
the  engagement  of  South-­South  cooperation  partners  should  be  
approached   with   a   progressive   manner.   The   so-­called   “twin-­
track”  deal,  thus,  was  an  optimal  option  grounded  on  the  careful  
political  calibration  of  changing  realities.
Korea’s  Gender  Initiative
Korea’s   proposal   to   include   gender   equality   in   the   Busan  
agenda  was  not  enthusiastically  received  at  the  initial  stage.  How-­
ever,  Korea,  in  close  cooperation  with  the  United  States,  the  UN  
:RPHQ DQG WKH*(1'(51(7 VXFFHVVIXOO\ SODFHG WKH LVVXH
high  on  the  effectiveness  agenda.  
The   political   support   rendered   by   the  UN  Women   and   Secre-­
tary   of  State  Clinton  was   also   instrumental   to   highlighting   the  
VLJQL¿FDQFH RI JHQGHU HTXDOLW\ DQG ZRPHQ¶V HPSRZHUPHQW
for   development   effectiveness.   As   a   result,   a   special   session  
RQ *HQGHU (TXDOLW\ ZDV RUJDQL]HG DV WKH PDLQ HYHQW RI WKH
%XVDQ)RUXPDQGD-RLQW$FWLRQ3ODQIRU*HQGHU(TXDOLW\DQG  
Development   was   adopted.   More   than   twenty   countries   and  
organizations  rendered  support  to  this  voluntary  action  plan.  
62 - KOREA’S ECONOMY 2012      
The  Role  of  Private  Sector
Another  notable  aspect  of  Busan  was   the  active   involvement  
RI WKHSULYDWH VHFWRU)RU WKH¿UVW WLPHRYHU UHSUHVHQWD-­
tives  from  the  private  sector  participated  in  the  Busan  Forum  
as   full   members   of   the   broader   effectiveness   partnership,  
LQFOXGLQJ ODUJH DQG VPDOO ¿UPV IURP ERWK GHYHORSHG DQG  
developing  countries.  
Korea   was   among   the   leaders   like   the   United   States   to  
advocate   the   role   of   private   sector   in   development.  A   strong  
private   sector   and  well-­functioning  market   has   been   the   key  
GULYHU RI SRYHUW\ UHGXFWLRQ MRE FUHDWLRQ DQG VXVWDLQDEOH
growth   in   Korea.   However,   the   private   sector’s   contribution  
VKRXOG QRW EH FRQ¿QHG WR IXQGLQJ RQO\ EXW LQYROYHPDUNHW
driven  technical  input  as  well  as  training  and  capacity  building.  
)RUWKLVDPRGHOZKHUHDSUR¿WREMHFWLYHPHHWVZLWKDGHYHORS-­
PHQWREMHFWLYHVKRXOGEHDGHTXDWHO\H[SORUHG
The   notion   that   development   and   the   emergence   of   new  





public  and  the  private  sector  in  Busan.  
Effective  Institutions  
(IIHFWLYH LQVWLWXWLRQV DUH LPSRUWDQW WR GHOLYHU GHYHORS-­
ment   results   in   a   sustainable   and   holistic  manner.  This   issue  
was   broadly   recognized   at   the   Busan   Forum   where   thirty  
organizations   and   countries   endorsed   a   New   Consensus   on  
(IIHFWLYH,QVWLWXWLRQV
Strengthening   effective   institutions   covers   the   issues   beyond  
the  existing  work  on   the  use  of  country  system  and  procure-­
ment,   and   addresses   the   importance   of   political   economy   of  
reform,  capacity  building,  and  institutional  changes.  
Busan Follow-up 
The   outcome   document   has   left   the   details   of   the   Busan  
3DUWQHUVKLS WR EH GHWHUPLQHG DIWHU WKH %XVDQ )RUXP 7KH  
PDQGDWHRIWKH:RUNLQJ3DUW\RQ$LG(IIHFWLYHQHVVKDVEHHQ  
extended   to   prepare   for   this   transition   period.   Making  
maximum  use  of   the  existing  group  of  sherpas  who  success-­
fully   negotiated   the  Busan   outcome   document,   the  members  
RI WKH:RUNLQJ 3DUW\ DJUHHG WR IRUP D 3RVW%XVDQ ,QWHULP  
*URXS 3%,* WR SUHSDUH GHWDLOHG WUDQVLWLRQ SODQV DQG  
OHDG FRQVXOWDWLYHSURFHVVHV7KHPHPEHUV RI WKH3%,*KDYH
been  extended   from   the  existing   sherpas   to   ensure   a  broader  
inclusiveness   of   stakeholders.   After   broad   consultations,  
WKH ¿QDO SURSRVDOV RI WKH ZRUNLQJ DUUDQJHPHQWV DQG WKH  
JOREDO PRQLWRULQJ IUDPHZRUN RI WKH %XVDQ 3DUWQHUVKLS ZLOO  
EH VXEPLWWHG WR WKH ODVW:RUNLQJ3DUW\RQ$LG(IIHFWLYHQHVV
PHHWLQJLQ-XQHIRUHQGRUVHPHQW
Closing 
Busan   represents   the   high   aspirations   of   the   global   develop-­
ment  community   for  effective  development  cooperation.  The  
LPSDFW RI WKH QHZ *OREDO 3DUWQHUVKLS ODUJHO\ GHSHQGV RQ  
support   by   all   development   stakeholders.   In   particular,   the  
voluntary  and  proactive  participation  of  emerging  economies  is  
essential  to  drive  the  new  global  partnership  forward.  Building  
trust   through  policy  dialogues  and  knowledge  sharing  should  
be  the  starting  point  to  work  with  the  new  partners.  However  
daunting  a   task   this  may  be,   the  Busan  Forum  demonstrated  
that  with  right  spirit  and  strong  political  will,  progress  can  be  
made.  The  Republic  of  Korea  will  remain  fully  committed  to  
working  closely  with  the  global  community  to  make  the  Busan  
spirit   alive   throughout   the   progressive   transformation   of   the  
new  global  partnership.  
Enna  Park  is  Director  General  for  Development  Cooperation  
of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Trade,  Republic  of  Korea.
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KOREAN PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT DEVELOPMENT AID
By Kwon Yul and Park Sukyung
Abstract
6LQFH MRLQLQJ WKH 2(&' 'HYHORSPHQW $VVLVWDQFH &RPPLWWHH '$& LQ  .RUHD DV D QHZ GRQRU KDV EHHQ DFWLYHO\  
carrying   out   reforms   to   improve   its   development   aid   system.   This   article   provides   recent   trends   of   public   opinion   in  
Korea   on   issues   of   aid   and   development   cooperation   by   presenting   the   survey   results.   It   introduces   the   background   of  
SDVW RSLQLRQ SROOV DQG SUHVHQWV SXEOLF DWWLWXGHV DQG SHUFHSWLRQV LQ .RUHD RQ IRUHLJQ DLG ,W LGHQWL¿HV WKH OHYHO RI SXEOLF  
support,  awareness,  motives  for  aid  giving,  priorities  in  development  aid,  as  well  as  the  assessment  of  the  contribution  of  Korea’s  
RI¿FLDO GHYHORSPHQW DVVLVWDQFH 2'$ )LQDOO\ LW H[DPLQHV KRZ WKH .RUHDQ JRYHUQPHQW FRXOG UHVSRQG WR FKDOOHQJHV WR  
improve  the  effectiveness  of  development  cooperation  and  to  convince  its  citizenry  to  pursue  its  ambitious  aid  policy.  
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Introduction
.RUHD¶V KLVWRU\ DV DQ RI¿FLDO GRQRU FRXQWU\ DQG DQ 2(&'  
DAC  member   is   short,   but   this  new  donor   country  has  been  
proactive  in  setting  a  foundation  for  development  cooperation  
since  it  accession  to  the  DAC  in  November  2009.  Followed  by  
WKH ¿UVW 2'$ UHIRUP SODQ LQ1RYHPEHU  WKH ,QWHU-­
national  Development  Cooperation  Act  was  enacted   in  early  
 DQG WKH2'$$GYDQFHPHQW 3ODQZDV DOVR SUHSDUHG LQ
October  2010.  
Despite   the   achievements   and   progress   it  made,  Korea   still  
has   a   long  way   to   go   in   order   to   improve   the   quantity   and  
quality  of  its  aid.  Korea  pledged  to  the  international  develop-­
PHQWFRPPXQLW\WRH[SDQGLWVDLGYROXPHWRDFKLHYHDQ2'$
GNI   ratio   of   0.25  percent   by   2015,  which   requires   doubling  
of   the   current   level   of  ODA   budget.   Besides   this   challenge,  
Korea  has  been  facing  several  aid  effectiveness  issues  such  as  
fragmentation  in  aid  implementation,  a  bifurcated  aid  delivery  
system  and  lack  of  coordination.  
$V .RUHD LV VFKHGXOHG WR KDYH LWV ¿UVW RI¿FLDO '$& SHHU  
review  in  2012,  it  would  be  timely  and  meaningful  to  review  
the   achievements   of   and   changes   in   Korea’s   development  
cooperation   for   the   past   two   years   since   its   accession   to  
DAC  through  the  eyes  of  the  Korean  public.  As  the  discussion  
on  the  reform  of  aid  policy  and  management  system  is  ongoing,  
Korea  needs  to  closely  monitor  how  the  public’s  perception  of  
global  development,  poverty  issues  and  international  develop-­
ment  cooperation  policies  has  been  shaped.  
This  paper  reviews  how  Korean  citizens  perceive  the  relatively  
new   issue   of   development   cooperation   and   how   the  Korean  
JRYHUQPHQWFRXOGSXUVXH LWVSROLF\REMHFWLYHVEDVHGRQSXE-­
OLFDZDUHQHVVDQGRSLQLRQ3DUWLFXODUO\LWDQDO\]HVWKHOHYHORI  
public  support,  awareness,  preference  and  participation  about  
foreign  aid  in  Korea  to  see  how  it  has  evolved  over  time  and  how  
it  relates  to  Korea’s  ODA  policy  and  practice.  Furthermore,  we  
will  also  make  comparisons  with  other  countries’  public  survey  
UHVXOWVZKHUHUHOHYDQWWR¿QGRXWXQLTXHRUFRPPRQFKDUDFWHU-­
istics  of  Korean  public  opinion  in  a  broader  context.  
Trends in Public Opinion on Development 
Aid in Korea
Background  of  Surveys  on  Development  Aid  in  Korea
Facing  a  downturn  in  the  level  of  ODA  spending  after  the  Asian  
¿QDQFLDOFULVLVLQWKHODWHVSXEOLFVXUYH\VRQIRUHLJQDLG
LQ.RUHDEHJDQ7KH¿UVW VXUYH\ZDV LQLWLDWHGE\.2,&$ LQ
1999  and  MOFAT1  conducted  another  survey  in  2002  for  the  
targeted  group  of  ‘opinion  leaders’  who  are  more  engaged  in  
ODA  policy,  in  addition  to  the  general  public.  In  2003,  Dong-­A  
DailyRQHRIWKHPDMRUQHZVSDSHUVLQ.RUHDODXQFKHGDMRLQW
survey  with  KOICA.  The  earlier  surveys  were  designed  mainly  
for  the  purpose  of  public  relations  about  ODA.  The  questions  
focused  on  the  level  of  attention  on  ODA,  and  the  awareness  
on  Korean  government’s  ODA  and  its  implementing  agencies.  
$V LWV2'$ OHYHO EHJDQ WR LQFUHDVH QRWLFHDEO\ IURP   
PLOOLRQ LQ  WR  PLOOLRQ LQ  VHFXULQJ SXEOLF  
support   for   the  expansion  of  ODA  was  posited  as  one  of   the  
Korean  government’s  policy  priorities.  In  this  regard,  the  Korea  
Information  Agency  conducted  a  survey  in  2005  and  MOFAT  
also   initiated   surveys   in   2008   and   2010   respectively.   These  
surveys   added   questions   closely   related   to   decision-­making  
issues  such  as  opinions  about  the  expansion  of  ODA  volume,  
priority  regions  and  sectors  to  provide  assistance,  and  ODA’s  
contribution  to  poverty  reduction  or  national  interest.  
This  section  of  the  paper  presents  the  result  of  the  most  recent  
public  survey  on  development  cooperation  conducted  in  2011  
by   Gallup   Korea   on   behalf   of   the   Korea   Institute   for   Inter-­  
QDWLRQDO(FRQRPLF3ROLF\.,(3WKURXJKDIDFHWRIDFHVXUYH\  
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acteristics   of   the   respondents   in   this   survey   are   summarized  
in  Box  1.  The  composition  of  respondents  by  gender  was  50  
percent  each  for  male  and  female.  The  age  group  was  divided  
LQWR¿YHFDWHJRULHVRIDQGDERYH
 DQG WKH UDWLR LQ HDFK JURXSZDV VHW DW DSSUR[LPDWHO\   
percent.   In   terms   of   region,   the   survey   followed   the  
administrative  district  of  the  country  and  the  number  of  sample  
was   proportionately   distributed   according   to   the   regional  
population;;   Seoul   and  Gyunggi   area   had   the   largest   number  
of   respondents   over   20   percent   each   and   the   rest   of   the   14  
regions   had   1.0   to   7.4   percent   of   respondents   depending   on  
the  size  of  the  regional  population.
The   survey   questions   include   various   aspects   of   foreign  
aid   such   as  motives   for   aid   giving,   level   of   support   for   aid,  
priorities   in  aid  policy,  effectiveness  of  aid  as  well  as  access  
to   relevant   information.   It   also   reviewed   the   results   of   past  
surveys  conducted  in  Korea  as  well  as  in  other  donor  countries  
VXFKDVWKH(82  to  gain  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  
of  the  Korean  public’s  opinion  on  aid  within  various  time  series  
and  country  context.
Comparing   the   results   with   the   previous   surveys,   three  
data  sets  are  reviewed  to  compare  the  trend  of  public  perceptions  
and   attitudes   toward   foreign   aid   in  Korea.3  Additionally,   the  
survey   results   of   other   donor   countries   will   be   introduced  
to  compare   the   similarities   and  differences  vis-­à-­vis  Korea  
despite   limitations  imposed  on  the  direct  comparison  among  
donor  countries  due  to  variations   in   the  design,  methodology  
and  the  respondent  sample  of  each  survey  limit.
The   following   section   introduces   the   level   of   support   and  
DZDUHQHVV RI WKH .RUHDQ SXEOLF LQ JHQHUDO 0RUH VSHFL¿F  
Table  1 2YHUYLHZRI3XEOLF6XUYH\VRQ)RUHLJQ$LGLQ.RUHD




















































this table only list surveys conducted after 2005. 
responses   to  various  policy   related   issues  such  as  motivation  
of  aid,  volume  of  aid,  priority  regions  and  areas  as  well  as  the  
assessment  of   aid  effectiveness  will  be  presented   in   the  next  
part   of   the   paper   with   corresponding   policy   initiatives   and  
changes  in  Korea.
Public  Support  
The   Korean   public   appears   highly   supportive   of   ODA   as  
more  than  90  percent  of  respondents  strongly  acknowledged  
the   importance   of   development   aid.   The   support   level  
increased   by  more   than   30   percent   compared   to   the   2005  
survey.   This   level   of   support   in   Korea   is   on   par   with   the  
RQHVRIRWKHUGRQRUVVXFKDV6ZHGHQSHUFHQW'HQPDUN  
 SHUFHQW ,UHODQG  SHUFHQW RU (8  SHUFHQW  
according   to   the   2010   survey.   Given   that   two   thirds  
RI SHUFHQWRISHRSOH LQ WKH VXUYH\ VWLOO UHJDUG  
Korea  as  a  developing  country,  it  is  interesting  to  know  that  
the   recognition   of   national   status   did   not  much   affect   the  
level  of  support  for  foreign  aid.
While  Koreans   are   largely   supportive  of  development   aid,  
survey   results   indicate   that   they   tend   to  be   less   enthusias-­
tic   when   it   comes   to   scaling   up   the   aid   volume.   Though  
Koreans  are  more  generous  than  before  regarding  the  level  
RI DLG WKHPDMRULW\ VWLOO SUHIHU WR SUHVHUYH WKH VWDWXV TXR
Such  limited  support  for  the  expansion  of  the  ODA  budget  
despite  the  higher  level  of  support  for  the  principle  of  devel-­
opment  assistance  could  be  best  explained  by  the  concerns  
over  the  current  state  of  the  economy,  according  to  previous  
VXUYH\ UHVXOWV3DUWLFXODUO\ DPRQJ WKRVHZKRDUHRSSRVHG
WR WKH SURYLVLRQ RI DLG WKH PDMRULW\  SHUFHQW RI  
respondents   were   concerned   with   the   country’s   economic  
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situation  and   this   is  consistent  with   the  2005  survey  result  
that   showed   two   thirds   of   people   think   that   “Korea   is   not  
rich  enough  to  provide  aid.”  
Public  Awareness  
Almost   half   of   the   Korean   public   is   aware   that   the   Korean  
government   is   providing   aid.   This   ratio   has   been   constantly  
increasing;;   from   37   percent   in   2005   to   about   50   percent   in  
2008  and  2011.  According  to  socio-­demographic  analysis,  the  
younger   generation   in   their   20s   showed   the   lowest   level   of  
awareness.  Similar  to  the  case  of  support  level,  better-­educated  
respondents  knew  more  about  the  fact  that  Korea  is  providing  
aid  to  developing  countries.
In  terms  of  awareness  of  global  development  agenda  items,  
VXFK DV 0'*V 0LOOHQQLXP 'HYHORSPHQW *RDOV PRUH
WKDQ KDOI  SHUFHQW KDYH ³QHYHU KHDUG RI´ 0'*V  
The   relatively   low   level   of   awareness   of   global   agendas  
has   remained   largely   unchanged   in   comparison   with   a  
previous  survey  in  2008.  Interestingly,  those  who  “have  heard  
of   it   without   knowing   in   detail”   represent   almost   a   third   of  
















development   education   to   boost   the   level   of   interest   and  
awareness   on   foreign   aid   in   the   future.   Analysis   of   the  
demographic   determinants   of   public   opinion   shows   that   the  
younger  generation  in  their  20s  was,  again,  the  least  informed  
about  MDGs.
There  was  correlation  between  the  level  of  support  and  aware-­
ness.   Those  who   know   better   about  MDGs   tend   to   strongly  
support   foreign   aid.   Out   of   those   respondents   who   are   well  
DZDUHRI0'*VSHUFHQW³VWURQJO\VXSSRUW´DQGDQRWKHU
54.1  percent   “support”  development   aid.  This   group   is  more  
enthusiastic   about   the   expansion  of  ODA  budgets,   as   almost  
one  third  of  the  respondents  think  that  Korea  should  increase  
LWV2'$DERYH WKHFRPPLWWHG OHYHO7KLV UHVXOWFRQ¿UPV WKH  
previous   research   outcomes   that   no   effective   action   is   taken  
ZLWKRXWVXI¿FLHQWSULRUDZDUHQHVV4
Motives  of  Aid  Giving
The   unique   characteristic   of   Korea   as   a   former-­recipient-­  
WRGRQRU LQHYLWDEO\ LQÀXHQFHV LWV PRWLYDWLRQ IRU DLG JLYLQJ  
In  2011,  13.4  percent  of  people  think  that  “Korea  should  give  










Figure 1 Level of Awareness on Korea’s ODA Provision
Note: “know” includes both “know very well” and “know.” “Don’t know” includes both “have 
heard of it without knowing in detail” and “don’t know at all.”
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Figure 2 Motives of Aid: Why Should Korea Give Aid to Developing Countries? (as a %)
Source: KIEP (2011)
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DFFRUGLQJWRWKHVXUYH\E\.,(37KLVWHQGHQF\LVDOVRIRXQG  
in  the  2008  survey,  where  the  response  ratio  was  higher,  at  30  
SHUFHQW$PRQJRWKHUGRQRUFRXQWULHV3RODQGVKRZVVLPLODU
survey   results   regarding  motives   for   giving   aid.  Almost   half  
RIWKHSHRSOHLQ3RODQGWKLQNWKDWLWLVWKHLUWXUQWRKHOSSRRU
SHRSOH VLQFH WKH\ EHQH¿WWHG IURP IRUHLJQ DLG IURP DIÀXHQW
countries;;   the   ratio   for   this   response   rose   to  50  percent   from  
33  percent  in  2004.5  
Aside   from   this   particular   consideration   for   Korea’s   past  
international  status  as  an  aid  recipient,  the  Korean  public  seems  
to   be  driven  more  by  humanitarian   and   egalitarian   reasons.  
According   to   a   2011   survey,   almost   a   third   of   the   respon-­
dents   replied   that   Korea   should   give   aid   to   “contribute   to  
JOREDOSHDFHDQGVWDELOLW\´SHUFHQWIROORZHGE\³PRUDO  
UHVSRQVLELOLW\DVDJOREDOFLWL]HQ´SHUFHQW7KHSHUFHQW-­
age  of  those  who  defend  the  aid  for  reasons  of  economic  and  
self-­interest  was  relatively  low,  at  20.1  percent.
Looking   at   examples   from   other   donor   countries,   a   2009  
(8 VXUYH\ VKRZV WKDW WZR RXW RI WKUHH (XURSHDQV  
responded  with   reasons  based  on   self-­interest   for   giving   aid  
SHUFHQWQDPHO\ WR IDFLOLWDWH WUDGH WRGHWHU WHUURULVP WR  
prevent  migration  and  maintain  positive  political  relations  with  
developing   countries.  This   tendency   is   particularly   strong   in  
Greece,  France  and  Belgium.
The  motive   for  giving  aid  also  differs  by  age  and   level  of  
HGXFDWLRQ 5HVSRQGHQWV RYHU WKH DJH RI  ZKR KDYH KDG  
direct   experience   as   aid   recipients   in   their   lifetime   tend   to  
¿QGWKHUHDVRQVRIDLGJLYLQJEDVHGRQWKHLUSHUVRQDOHYHQWV  
A   large   number   of   better-­educated   respondents   regard  
moral   responsibility   as   the   foremost   reason   for   giving   aid  
 SHUFHQW ZKLOH D OHVVHGXFDWHG JURXS WHQGV WR GH¿QH  
Korea’s  past  experience  as  a  recipient  country  as  the  primary  
motivational  factor.  
The   International   Development   Cooperation   Act   enacted  
LQ VSHFL¿HV WKHREMHFWLYHVRI.RUHD¶V2'$DV IROORZV
“to   reduce   poverty   and   enhance   sustainable   development   in  
developing   countries   based   on   humanitarianism;;   to   promote  
economic   cooperation   with   partner   countries   and   to   pursue  
global  peace  and  prosperity.”  The  debate  over  what  the  motive  
for  foreign  aid  should  be  is  not  new  and  Korea  is  not  the  only  
FRXQWU\WKDWKDVKDGGLI¿FXOW\DQVZHULQJWKHTXHVWLRQ
,W LV QDWXUDO IRU.RUHD DV D QHZ GRQRU WR VWUXJJOH WR GH¿QH
its   aid   philosophy   and   ethics   among   contending   norms   and  
YDOXHV,Q.RUHDZKDWWKHREMHFWLYHRIDLGVKRXOGEHKDVEHHQ
long  debated.  Should  ODA  proceed  primarily  for  economic  and  
humanitarian  reasons,  or  should  national  interest  play  a  part  as  
well?  Korea’s   strong   inclination   to   assimilate   into   the   group  
of   traditional   donors   who   are   often   referred   to   as   advanced  
donors   by   the   Korean   government   strongly   implies   to   what  
direction  the  country  is  headed.7  This  sentiment  is  also  emulated  
LQ.RUHD¶VDLGSKLORVRSK\DQGWKHGHMXUHSULQFLSOHRI.RUHDQ
aid  leans  towards  international  values.  
Priorities  
According   to   2011   survey   results,   almost   40   percent   of  
Korean   people   consider   sub-­Saharan   Africa   as   the   most  
important   destination   for   Korean   aid   while   attention   to  Asia  
also  remained  strong  as  a  substantial  percentage  of  respondents  
VWDWHG 6RXWKHDVW $VLD  SHUFHQW DQG 6RXWK $VLD   
SHUFHQW DV QH[W LQ WKH OLVW RI SULRULWLHV 7KH JURZLQJ LQWHUHVW  
in  Africa   as   a   destination   for   ODA  was   also   observed   in   the  
2005  survey;;  almost  half  of  respondents   indicate  Africa  as   the  
SULRULW\UHJLRQIROORZHGE\$VLD3DFL¿FSHUFHQW8  
The  share  of  Asian  countries  among  Korea’s  top  ten  recipients  
VXFK DV 9LHWQDP %DQJODGHVK 6UL /DQND DQG 0RQJROLD LV  
QRWDEOH UHSUHVHQWLQJSHUFHQWRI WRWDOELODWHUDO DLG%XW
WKH¿JXUHKDVWHQGHGWRÀXFWXDWHZLOGO\LWUHDFKHGSHU-­
cent  in  2001,  down  to  52.2  percent  in  2008,  decreased  further  
to  38.5  percent   in  2009,  until   soaring  again   in  2010.  While  
maintaining   a   strong   regional   focus   on  Asia,  Korea   tries   to  
balance   its   regional  ODA  allocation   by   providing  more   aid  
to  Africa;;   the   amount  of   aid  going   to   the   region  more   than  
WULSOHGIURPPLOOLRQLQWRPLOOLRQLQ
Sub-­Saharan  countries  received  most  of  the  aid;;  top  recipients  
LQ$IULFDLQFOXGH7DQ]DQLDPLOOLRQ$QJROD
6HQHJDODQG(WKLRSLDLQ
7KHH[SDQVLRQRI IRFXVRQ$IULFD LVSDUWO\ UHÀHFWHG LQVRPH  
RIWKHKLJKOHYHOLQLWLDWLYHVVXFKDV3UHVLGHQW/HH0\XQJEDN¶V
UHFHQWYLVLW WR$IULFDQFRXQWULHV(WKLRSLDDQG'5&RQJR LQ
-XO\  DQG DOVR WKH  YLVLW RI WKH ODWH 3UHVLGHQW5RK
0RRK\XQWR(J\SW1LJHULDDQG$OJHULD'XULQJ5RK¶VYLVLWWR
Africa,  he  announced  the  Initiative  for  Development  in  Africa  
and  pledged  to  increase  the  ODA  level  for  Africa  by  three-­fold  
by  2008  and  expand  cooperation  through  sharing  of  develop-­
ment  knowledge  and  increasing  the  number  of  volunteers  and  
medical  teams  to  Africa.  
For  priority   sectors,   the  2011   survey   results   show   that   the  
PDMRULW\RI.RUHDQVWKLQN.RUHDFDQPRVWHIIHFWLYHO\SURYLGH
assistance   in   social   and  economic   infrastructure  and   services  
such  as  health,  education,  transport  or  energy.  Actually,  Korea  
SURYLGHGD WRWDORIPLOOLRQ LQ WKHVH VHFWRUVZKLFK  
is   88.1   percent   of   total   bilateral  ODA   in   2009.  Beside   these  
sectors,   agricultural   development   was   regarded   as   the  
SRWHQWLDO VHFWRU WKDW .RUHD FDQ KHOS RXW HIIHFWLYHO\   
percent  of  respondents  think  Korea  has  a  competitive  edge  in  
agricultural   development   and   this   reaction   stands   out   among  
UHVSRQGHQWV LQ WKHLU V DQG V ZLWK OHVV HGXFDWLRQ RU  
lower  income.  
By   sector,   social   and   economic   infrastructure   and   services  
have   traditionally   received   the   largest   portion   amounting  
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WR DSSUR[LPDWHO\ WRSHUFHQWDJHRI WRWDO ELODWHUDO2'$
DQG LW KDV LQFUHDVHG VLJQL¿FDQWO\ VLQFH  3DUWLFXODUO\  
VXSSRUW LQ VXFK VHFWRUV DV HGXFDWLRQ DQG JRYHUQPHQWFLYLO  
society  was  outstanding   in  2010  compared   to  previous  years  
and   this   change   has  meant   a   doubling   in   the   amount   of   aid  
disbursed  to  the  social  sectors.  
Assessment  on  the  Contribution  of  Korea’s  ODA
The   attitude   of   the  Korean   public   is  mostly   positive   toward  
.RUHD¶V 2'$ FRQWULEXWLRQV  SHUFHQW WKLQN WKDW  
“Korea’s  ODA  contributes   to   the  economic  development  and  
poverty   reduction   in   developing   countries.”   Those   who   are  
more   supportive   and   aware   of  Korea’s   experience   as   an   aid  
recipient   tend   to   be   even   more   positive   concerning   Korea’s  
contribution   to   developing   countries   through   aid.   Attitudes  
on  Korean  ODA  have  grown  even  more  positive  since  2005,  
when   slightly   more   than   half   of   respondents   thought   that  
Korea’s  ODA  contributes   toward   tackling  global   issues.  This  
UDWLRMXPSHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\WRSHUFHQWLQ
Among   skeptics   of   Korea’s   contribution   to   developing  
countries   are   those   who   are   concerned   with   problems  
prevalent   in   developing   countries.   “Weak   aid   management  
FDSDFLW\´  SHUFHQW DQG ³ODFN RI VHOIKHOS´   
SHUFHQWDUHWKHWZRPDLQUHDVRQVZKHQFLWLQJDLGLQHIIHFWLYH-­
ness.  Others  pointed  out  some  domestic   issues  such  as  “lack  
RI VSHFLDOL]DWLRQ RI DLG DJHQFLHV´  SHUFHQW ³ODFN RI
WUDQVSDUHQF\ LQ DLGPDQDJHPHQW´ SHUFHQW¶ ³VPDOO DLG  
YROXPH´SHUFHQWDQGDQ³LQHI¿FLHQWDLGV\VWHP´
SHUFHQW,QWKHVXUYH\ZKLFKDVNHGWKHVDPHTXHVWLRQV
a   third  of   the   respondents  were   concerned   about   “corruption  
in  developing  countries”  as  well  as  “poor  management  of  aid  
LQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV´SHUFHQW9  As  survey  questions  
and   response  options  were  not   identical   for   the   two  surveys,  
it   is   hard   to   track   down   the   trends   of   response   over   time.  
However,  it  is  still  worth  noting  that  the  Korean  public  recog-­
nizes   issues  of  developing  countries  as   the  main  reasons   that  
hamper  aid  effectiveness.  
7KH VWURQJ HPSKDVLV RQ HI¿FLHQF\ DQG HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI DLG
among   the   Korean   public   can   also   be   observed   in   other  
DVSHFWV7KHPDMRULW\RIWKH.RUHDQSXEOLFLVPRVWLQWHUHVWHG  
LQ ZKHWKHU WKH DLG SURMHFW KDV DFWXDOO\ KHOSHG GHYHORSLQJ  
FRXQWULHV  SHUFHQW DQG LI WKH DLG EXGJHW ZDV XVHG  
HI¿FLHQWO\  SHUFHQW10 $ERXW D WKLUG  SHUFHQW RI  
UHVSRQGHQWVWKLQNWKDWSRVWSURMHFWIROORZXSDQGPDLQWHQDQFH
is   important.   The   2008   survey   shows   a   similar   tendency   to  
IRFXV RQ HIIHFWLYHQHVV DQG HI¿FLHQF\ DV WKH PDMRULW\ RI  
respondents   were   interested   whether   aid   was   properly   used  
E\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW RI WKH GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWU\  SHUFHQW
DQG WR ZKDW H[WHQW WKH DLG SURMHFW FRQWULEXWHV WR SRYHUW\  
UHGXFWLRQLQWKHUHFLSLHQWFRXQWU\SHUFHQW
In  terms  of  aid  agency,  Koreans  demonstrate  almost  the  same  
OHYHO RI FRQ¿GHQFH WRZDUGJRYHUQPHQW DJHQFLHV DQG1*2V
SHUFHQWRI UHVSRQGHQWV VDLG WKDW1*2VDUHEHVWSODFHG WR
GHOLYHU HIIHFWLYH DLG DQG DQRWKHU  SHUFHQW H[SHFWHG WKDW
aid   through   government   agencies  would   be  more   effective.11  
An   interesting  difference   according   to   the   level  of   education  
DSSHDUHGWKHPRUHHGXFDWHGWKHUHVSRQGHQWVDUHWKHPRUHWKH\
trusted  NGOs   than   government   agencies.  Also,   students   and  
KLJKLQFRPH JURXSV DOVR VKRZHG D KLJK OHYHO RI FRQ¿GHQFH
with  NGOs.  
Public  Participation  and  Information
Slightly   over   two   thirds   of   Koreans   describe   themselves  
as   being   in   favor   of   helping   developing   countries,   without  
being  a  volunteer  or  giving  donations.  The  ratio  of  people  who  
are  actively  engaged  in  activities,  such  as  giving  donations  or  
YROXQWHHULQJZDV1LQHRXWRIWHQ.RUHDQVEHOLHYHWKDW
it   is   important   to   help   developing   countries,   however,   the  
level  of  participation  and  involvement  remains  relatively  low.  
9HU\ IHZ.RUHDQV DUHRSSRVHG WRGHYHORSPHQW FRRSHUDWLRQ  
in  general  but  one  in  ten  Koreans  seems  to  be  indifferent  to  
voluntary  activities  or  donations  as  they  simply  mention  that  
“they  are  not   interested.”  This   result   exhibits   a  discrepancy  
between   the  perceived   importance  of  development  coopera-­
tion  and  actual  participation.  
Socio-­demographic   analysis   shows   that   high-­income   groups  
DUHPRUH DFWLYH LQ GRQDWLRQVGXH WR WKHQDWXUDO UHDVRQRI¿-­
nancial   affordability.   However,   the   level   of   participation   as  
volunteers  is  not  necessarily  related  to  income  levels,  as  some  
lower-­income  level  groups  showed  an  even  higher  participation  
rate.  Those  who  have  visited  developing  countries  appeared  to  
EHPRUHZLOOLQJ WRJLYHGRQDWLRQV SHUFHQWRUZRUN DV
DYROXQWHHUSHUFHQW,WFDQEHVHHQDVHYLGHQFHRIGLUHFW
learning  experience  about  situations  in  developing  countries  af-­
fecting  the  level  of  engagement  to  help  developing  countries.  
In   terms  of  exposure   to  media  coverage  on   foreign  aid  and  
.RUHD¶V 2'$ DFWLYLWLHV RYHU KDOI RI UHVSRQGHQWV   
SHUFHQWDFTXLUHGLQIRUPDWLRQWKURXJKYDULRXVPHGLDVRXUFHV
However,  a  greater  percentage  of  younger  people  in  their  20s  
stated  that  they  were  not  familiar  with  information  on  devel-­
opment  aid.  This  is  consistent  with  the  result  that  this  group  
is  the  least  aware  of  the  fact  that  Korea  received  aid  in  the  past.  
In  addition,  students,  among  other  occupations,  are  the  least  
acquainted  with  stories  on  foreign  aid.  
Knowledge  and  information  on  development  aid  obtained  from  
YDULRXVPHGLDVRXUFHVVHHPWRLQFUHDVHWKHOHYHORIDZDUHQHVV
more  informed  groups  showed  higher  levels  of  awareness  on  
0'*VE\QHDUO\IRXUIROGSHUFHQW12  and  on  Korea’s  pro-­
YLVLRQRIGHYHORSPHQWDLGE\DIDFWRURIWZRSHUFHQW,Q
terms  of  support  level,  those  who  are  familiar  with  information  
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on  foreign  aid  tend  to  show  a  slightly  higher  level  of  support.  
They  tend  to  recognize  to  a  greater  degree  the  importance  of  aid  
in  helping  developing  countries  and  expressed  a  higher   level  
of  support  for  providing  aid.  In  addition,  informed  respondents  
were  more  positive  on  their  assessment  of  the  level  of  con-­
tribution  of  Korea’s  ODA.  However,  the  support  level  in  terms  
of  current  ODA  volume  or  expansion  of  future  aid  budget  does  
QRWVHHPWRUHÀHFWWKHVHWUHQGV
Policy Challenges for Korea
Korea,   as   a   new   DAC   member,   pledged   the   international  
development   community   to   expand   its   aid   volume   and   has  
pursued   various   institutional   arrangements   to   enhance   the  
quality   of   its   aid.   For   the  Korean   government   to   achieve   its  
ambitious   aid   policy   goals,   one   of   the   critical   factors   is   to  
gain   public   support   and   to   create   a   society-­wide   consensus  
on   the   need   for   better   and   more   aid.   Conducting   surveys  
to  gauge  public  opinion  on  development  cooperation   is  one  
convenient  way  to  assess  the  trend.  Despite  its  relatively  short  
history   as   a  donor,   the   support   for   foreign   aid   in  Korea   is  
stronger   now   than   in   the   past,   as   the   survey   results   reveal.  
7KHUHGH¿QLWHO\H[LVWVDSRVLWLYHHQYLURQPHQWWRDGYDQFHWKH
Korean  government’s  ODA  policy  in  the  long  term.  
Table  4 &RUUHODWLRQ%HWZHHQWKH([SRVXUHWR0HGLDDQG/HYHORI6XSSRUW$ZDUHQHVVDVD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However,   Korea   still   faces   several   challenges   despite   these  
advances.   According   to   survey   results,   immediate   improve-­
ment  is  needed  with  respect  to  enhancing  transparency  of  aid  
policy   and  dissemination  of   information  on   aid   as  well   as  
SRVWFRPSOHWLRQPDQDJHPHQWRIDLGSURMHFWV,QWHUPVRIWUDQV-­
parency,  the  Korean  government  needs  to  pay  attention  to  the  
IDFW WKDW WKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF LVPRUH LQWHUHVWHG LQHI¿FLHQF\
and  effectiveness  of  aid  policy  and  their  implementation  than  
before.  It  needs  to  regard  the  general  public  as  one  of  the  key  
stakeholders   in   development   cooperation,   as   they   pay   taxes  
which  fund  aid  programs  in  other  part  of  the  world.  The  
nature   of   development   aid,  where   the   policies   do   not   directly  
LQÀXHQFH WKH ZHOOEHLQJ RI LWV RZQ FLWL]HQV EXW UDWKHU
anonymous  people  beyond   its   borders,   there   exists   a   large  
discrepancy  between  the  opacity  vis-­à-­vis  the  public  and  their  
concerns  about  global  issues.13
Similarly,   a   large   number   of   respondents   pointed   out   the  
LPSRUWDQFHRISRVWFRPSOHWLRQPDQDJHPHQW IRU DLGSURMHFWV
and   strengthening   feasibility   studies   and   ex-­ante   evaluation.  
Focus   on   the   substance   and   result-­based  management   of  
DLG SURMHFWV KDV EHHQ JURZLQJ DV WKH .RUHDQ SXEOLF KDV
better  access  through  media  and  press  coverage  to  monitor  the  
aid  effectiveness.  
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In  addition,  other   issues   related   to   the  aid  system  should  not  
EH LJQRUHG  IUDJPHQWDWLRQ RI DLG LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ ERGLHV
where  more  than  a  hundred  government  agencies  take  part  in  
aid  delivery  based  on   their  priorities  has  been  pointed  out  as  
D PDMRU GHWULPHQW WR DLG HIIHFWLYHQHVV DQG FRKHUHQFH DQG  
WKHODFNRIVSHFLDOLVWVZKRXQGHUVWDQGVHFWRUVUHJLRQVDQG
VLWXDWLRQVLQWKH¿HOGLVDPDMRUKXUGOH.RUHDPXVWRYHUFRPH
Lastly,   the  Korean  government   could   take   a  more   systematic  
approach  to  enhance  the  level  of  awareness  on  aid  and  devel-­
opment  cooperation,  particularly  by  forming  target  groups  and  
strategies  according  to  their  stance  on  aid,  age  groups  and  per-­
sonal  background  such  as  level  of  education.  When  the  Korean  
public  is  well  informed  of  issues  related  to  development  cooper-­
ation,  they  are  more  likely  to  act  or  express  their  support  for  aid.
Conclusion
As  a  new  DAC  member,  Korea  has   set  ambitious  aid  policy  
goals  and  pursued  various   initiatives   for  providing  more  and  
better   aid.  One  of   the  critical   factors   for   the  Korean  govern-­
PHQWLQMXVWLI\LQJLWVSROLF\GULYHVDQGLQYHVWPHQWVLVWRJDLQ
public  support  and  to  form  a  broad  social  consensus.  With  the  
changes  and  reforms  in  its  aid  system  to  improve  the  quality  of  
aid,   the  country  has  continuously  striven  to  develop  its  ODA  
policy  as  well  as  to  gain  public  support.  In  response  to  efforts  to  
increase  the  volume  of  aid  and  to  improve  the  aid  system,  public  
FRQFHUQVDERXWIRUHLJQDLGSROLF\KDYHVLJQL¿FDQWO\LQFUHDVHG
DV ZHOO 3XEOLF VXSSRUW WRZDUGV WKH H[SDQVLRQ RI WKH 2'$  
budget   is  essential   to  maintain   the  promise  Korea  made  with  
the  international  community  on  increasing  aid  volume.  
Most  DAC  members  conduct  public  opinion  surveys  periodi-­
cally   in   order   to   analyze   and   assess   the  public’s   perception  
and  awareness  of  development  assistance.  This  is  because  the  
PDMRULW\RIFLWL]HQVDUHWD[SD\HUVZKRSD\FORVHDWWHQWLRQWR  
WKH HIIHFWLYH VSHQGLQJ RI ¿QDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV EDVHG RQ WKH
appropriate   aid   policy.   Moreover,   survey   results   provide  
important   background   information   to   set   up   effective   pub-­
lic  engagement  and  development  education  programs  in   the  
FRXQWU\ ZKLFK SRVLWLYHO\ LQÀXHQFH WKH VXSSRUW DQG XQGHU
standing  of  the  donor’s  foreign  aid.  
3XEOLFRSLQLRQVXUYH\VSURYHWREHPHDQLQJIXOZLWKUHVSHFW
to  recommending  effective  ODA  policy  agendas  and  directions  
WR WKH .RUHDQ JRYHUQPHQW ,W DOVR SURYLGHV XVHIXO ¿QGLQJV
about  important  factors  that  affect  the  general  public’s  attitude  
towards   development   aid   in  Korea,   such   as   the   respondent’s  
Figure  3 7KH0RVW8UJHQW3ROLF\,VVXHVLQ.RUHD¶V2'$
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Thorough post-completion management of aid project
Strengthening feasibility study and ex-ante evaluation
Training of aid specialist
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Figure 3 The Most Urgent Policy Issues in Korea’s ODA
Source: KIEP (2011)
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VRFLRGHPRJUDSKLF SUR¿OHV SHUVRQDO H[SHULHQFHV SHUFHSWLRQ
RISRYHUW\UHFRJQLWLRQRI.RUHD¶VQDWLRQDOVWDWXVDGHYHORSHG
RUGHYHORSLQJFRXQWU\DZDUHQHVVRI IRUHLJQDLGSURMHFWVDV
well  as  experience  of  visiting  developing  countries.  
In   conclusion,   the   Korean   government   must   gain   full  
understanding   of   public   opinion   towards   foreign   aid   and  
implementation  of  its  ODA  policy  in  order  to  establish  greater  
public  support  as  a  new  and  small  donor.  The  public  poll  on  
development  cooperation  may  be  one  useful  way  to  see  how  
Korea’s   aid   policy   and   practice   are   being   accepted   by   its  
people.   Despite   its   relatively   short   history   as   a   donor,   the  
support   for  development  aid   in  Korea   is  stronger  now  as   the  
VXUYH\ UHVXOWV UHYHDO 7KLV LV GH¿QLWHO\ D SRVLWLYH IDFWRU LQ  
advancing  Korea’s  ODA  policy   in   the   long   term,   and  Korea  
needs  to  sustain  the  course.
Dr.   Park   Sukyung   is   a   Senior   Researcher   at   the   Korea  
Institute   for  International  Economic  Policy.  Dr.  Kwon  Yul   is  a  
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Korea   has  made   an   excellent   start   on   becoming   a   global   leader   on   development   and   poverty   reduction,   drawing   on   its  
UHPDUNDEOHH[SHULHQFHLQPRYLQJIURPGHVWLWXWLRQWRDIÀXHQFHLQDVLQJOHJHQHUDWLRQ.RUHD¶VOHDGHUVKLSGXULQJWKH6HRXO
Summit  in  putting  development  on  the  G-­20  agenda,  in  hosting  the  Busan  high-­level  conference  on  aid  effectiveness,  and  
establishing  the  Global  Green  Growth  Institute  have  attracted  favorable  international  attention.  But  Korea’s  development-­
related   policies   lag   far   behind   its   rhetoric   and   other   high-­income   countries.   Korea   can   address   these   shortcomings   by  
participating   in   international   development   organizations,   improving   development-­related   policies   in   areas  where   there   is  
little   domestic   political   resistance;;   and   setting   aside   part   of  Korea’s  modest   aid   budget   as   an   aid   innovation   fund.  None  
of  these  measures  would  require  an  increase  in  Korea’s  foreign  aid  spending.  They  are  smart,  low-­cost  moves  that  build  on  
Koreas’  tradition  of  punching  above  its  weight  in  the  global  arena.
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The   Republic   of   Korea   has   thrust   itself   onto   the   inter-­  
national   stage   as   a   would-­be   leader   on   global   development,  
achieving   much   in   terms   of   international   recognition.   But  
Korea’s   aid   program   and   its   policies   towards   developing  
countries  often  fall  short,  even  of  the  relatively  low  standards  
set   by   the   established   donor   countries.   Korea   can   do   much  
better,   establishing   itself   as   a   true   global   leader,   if   it   takes  
advantage  of  its  status  as  a  newcomer  to  champion  promising  
QHZDSSURDFKHVMXVWDV.RUHDQ¿UPVEHFDPHKRXVHKROGQDPHV
around   the  world  by   leapfrogging  over  analog   technology   to  
lead  the  way  in  the  digital  communications  revolution.  
Korea   has   clearly   signaled   its   ambition   to   be   a   leader   on  
global  development.  Drawing  on  Korea’s  unusual  experience  
LQ PDNLQJ WKH WUDQVLWLRQ IURP SRYHUW\ WR DIÀXHQFH LQ D  
single   generation,   the  Korean   government   pushed   to   include  
development   issues   on   the   G-­20   agenda   when   it   hosted   the  
2010   Seoul   Summit,   establishing   an   intergovernmental  
development   working   group   that   continues   to   operate,   and  
launching  a  multi-­year  action  plan.  In  2011  Korea  hosted  the  
)RXUWK +LJK /HYHO )RUXP RQ $LG (IIHFWLYHQHVV LQ %XVDQ
GUDZLQJ KXQGUHGV RI DLG H[SHUWV DQG RI¿FLDO JRYHUQPHQW  
representatives  from  around  the  world.
Korea   has   supported   the   creation   of   the   Seoul-­based  
*OREDO*UHHQ*URZWK,QVWLWXWH***,DQHZLQWHUQDWLRQDO  
organization   that   provides   advice   on   sustainable   growth   to  
GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV$QG.RUHDKDVMRLQHGWKH'HYHORSPHQW
$VVLVWDQFH&RPPLWWHH'$&RIWKH3DULVEDVHG2UJDQL]DWLRQ
IRU (FRQRPLF &RRSHUDWLRQ DQG 'HYHORSPHQW 2(&' WKH
Western-­dominated  aid  donors  club.  
Two   men   born   in   Korea   are   individually   prominent   in   the  
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ¿JKW DJDLQVW SRYHUW\ 81 *HQHUDO 6HFUHWDU\  
Ban   Ki-­moon   frequently   recalls   the   poverty   of   his  
childhood   in   Korea,   when   his   family   lacked   electricity   and  
he  studied  by  kerosene  light,  in  explaining  his  push  to  provide  
GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVZLWKVXVWDLQDEOHHQHUJ\IRUDOO-LP.LP  
an   American   medical   anthropologist   born   in   Korea,   has  
recently   been   selected   as   the   president   of   the  World   Bank.  
:KLOH .LP¶V VHOHFWLRQ LV QRW D UHÀHFWLRQ RI D .RUHDQ  
government   initiative,   the   two   high   level   positions   further  
emphasize   Korea’s   sudden   new   prominence   in   global  
development  issues.  
For   all   this,   however,   South   Korea   is   very   much   a   new-­
comer   to   global   discussions   on   international   development,  
and   its  aid  program  and  non-­aid  policies   towards  developing  
countries  rank  at  or  near  the  bottom  when  compared  to  those  of  
other  high-­income  countries.  This  is  not  surprising,  given  that  
Korea   has  moved   so   quickly   from   being   an   aid   recipient   to  
an   aid   donor.   Nonetheless,   a   frank   recognition   of   Korea’s  
substantial  shortcomings  in  this  regard  is  crucial  if  these  are  to  
be  overcome.
I  am  a  great  admirer  of  the  Korean  people  and  of  the  effective-­
ness  and  resilience  of  Republic  of  Korea  government  institutions,  
KDYLQJZRUNHGLQ6HRXODVDUHSRUWHUIRU$)3IRUWZR\HDUVLQ
1987  and  1988,  a  period  that  included  the  stormy  transition  to  
democracy  and  the  hosting  of  the  Olympics.  
Although   I   had   lived   and  worked   in   several  Asian   countries  
by   the   time   I   was   posted   to   Seoul,   I   was   deeply   impressed  
by   the   determination   of   Koreans   to   excel   internationally  
LQ¿HOGVDVGLYHUVHDVEXVLQHVVFXOWXUHDQGVSRUWV ,EHOLHYH  
that   Korea’s   push   to   be   a   leader   in   development   is   part   of  
this   drive   for   excellence   and   international   prestige,   and   that  
it  can  achieve  similar  success.  By  drawing  on  traits  that  have  
EHHQ D VRXUFH RI QDWLRQDO VWUHQJWK IRU .RUHD²RSHQQHVV WR  
LQQRYDWLRQ DQG DQ HDJHUQHVV WR OHDUQ IURP H[SHULHQFH²  
.RUHDFDQEHFRPHDWUXHZRUOGOHDGHULQWKHJOREDO¿JKWDJDLQVW  
poverty   and   inequality.   First,   however,   it   is   necessary   to  
recognize  where  Korea  currently  falls  short.  
.RUHD¶V DLG EXGJHW DW DSSUR[LPDWHO\  ELOOLRQ SHU \HDU  
in   2011,   is   small   not   only   in   absolute   terms   but   also   as   a  




E\ FRPSDULVRQ VRPH(XURSHDQ GRQRUV DUH FORVH WR WKH   
SHUFHQWJRDOSURPRWHGE\PDQ\GHYHORSPHQWDGYRFDWHV
,QPRUHWKDQKDOIRI.RUHD¶VDLGSHUFHQWZDVWLHG
that   is,   recipient  countries  were   required   to  use   it   to  hire  Ko-­
UHDQ¿UPVRUEX\.RUHDQSURGXFWV D VWLSXODWLRQ WKDW UHGXFHV
the  effective  purchasing  power  of  aid  since  recipients  are  unable  
to  seek  out   the  best  value  for  money;;  here  again  Korea  ranks  





A   more   detailed   measure   of   aid   quality,   CGD’s   Quality   of  
2I¿FLDO 'HYHORSPHQW $VVLVWDQFH 4X2'$ VKHGV IXUWKHU  
light  on  the  Republic  of  Korea  aid  programs.  QuODA  measures  
DLG TXDOLW\ DFURVV IRXU GLPHQVLRQV PD[LPL]LQJ HI¿FLHQF\
UHZDUGV GRQRUVZKR FKDQQHO DLG WR SRRUZHOOJRYHUQHG
countries,  minimize  administrative  costs,  support  global  public  
JRRGVDQGXQWLHDLGIRVWHULQJLQVWLWXWLRQVUHZDUGVGRQRUVZKR
KHOS WR EXLOG WKH UHFLSLHQW JRYHUQPHQW¶V FDSDFLW\ UHGXFLQJ
EXUGHQ UHZDUGV FRRUGLQDWLRQ ZLWK RWKHU GRQRUV DQG SHQDOL]HV  
ODUJH QXPEHUV RI VPDOO SURMHFWV DQG WUDQVSDUHQF\ DQG  
OHDUQLQJUHZDUGVGRQRUVIRUSURPSWO\UHOHDVLQJLQIRUPDWLRQDQG  
IRUHQFRXUDJLQJUHFLSLHQWFRXQWU\HYDOXDWLRQDQGOHDUQLQJ
A  comparison   of  Korea’s   performance   on  QuODA  with   that  
RI -DSDQ DQG WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV VHH KWWSZZZFJGHYRUJ  




PD[LPL]LQJ HI¿FLHQF\ IRVWHULQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG UHGXFLQJ  
EXUGHQ 7KH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV GRHV VLJQL¿FDQWO\ EHWWHU WKDQ  
.RUHDLQRQHGLPHQVLRQWUDQVSDUHQF\DQGOHDUQLQJ
Drilling   deeper   into   QuODA,   it’s   possible   to   compare   the  
VFRUHV RI LQGLYLGXDO DLG DJHQFLHV VHH KWWSZZZFJGHYRUJ
VHFWLRQWRSLFVDLGBHIIHFWLYHQHVVTXRGD"S LD	G   
7KH -DSDQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RRSHUDWLRQ $JHQF\ -,&$ RXW  
performs   the   Korea   International   Cooperation   Agency  
.2,&$ LQ DOO IRXU GLPHQVLRQV .2,&$ DQG WKH 8QLWHG  
6WDWHV$JHQF\IRU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO'HYHORSPHQW86$,'VFRUH
about  the  same.
Korea’s   aid   score   on   the  CDI   and   its   rankings   on  QuODA  
provide   a   simple   set   of   diagnostics,   benchmarked   against  
other  donor  countries,  that  can  guide  Korea’s  efforts  to  improve  
its   foreign   assistance   programs.   Raising   the   amount   of   aid  
Korea  provides  need  not  be  a  priority.  In  fact,  there  is  a  lively  
debate  within  the  development  community  about  whether  or  
not  aid  actually  helps  development.   Instead,  Korean  policy-­
makers   should   concentrate   on   improving   aid   quality,   steps  
that  would  improve  Korea’s  ranking  on  the  aid  component  of  
the  CDI  and  on  QuODA.  Untying  a   larger  share  of  Korea’s  
aid  would   be   one   important   step;;   improving   aid   allocation,  
so   that   a   large   share   goes   to   poor,  well-­governed   countries  
is  another.  Allocating  a  larger  share  of  Korea’s  aid  to  activi-­
WLHVWKDWVXSSRUWJOREDOSXEOLFJRRGVVXFKDVWKH¿JKWDJDLQVW  
climate   change,   would   help   to   improve   Korea’s   QuODA  
VFRUHIRUPD[LPL]LQJHI¿FLHQF\
But  the  single  most  important  thing  Korea  can  do  is  to  lever-­
age  its  small  aid  budget  by  becoming  a  champion  of    innovation  
and  learning.  
How?   Korea   should   announce   that   it   is   setting   aside   a  
VXEVWDQWLDO VKDUH VD\  SHUFHQW RI LWV DLG EXGJHW DV DQ  
international   “Aid   Innovation   Fund”   that   would   be   used  
to   experiment   with   new   approaches   to   foreign   assistance.  
Innovations   to   be   funded   could   be   selected   on   a   competi-­
tive   basis,   and   the   results  monitored   and   evaluated   by   an  
independent   entity,   with   the   costs   of   the   evaluation   and  
dissemination  of  the  results  also  covered  by  the  fund.
Such  a  fund  would  meet  an  important  global  need.  There  are  
many  promising  new  proposals  for  improving  aid  delivery,  but  
EHFDXVHH[LVWLQJIXQGLQJLVFRPPLWWHGWRRQJRLQJSURMHFWVDQG
approaches,  very  few  new  ideas  are  systematically  tested  and  
evaluated.  As  a  new  donor,  Korea  is  much  less  bound  than  other  
GRQRUVWRWUDGLWLRQDODSSURDFKHVDQGKDVJUHDWHUÀH[LELOLW\WR
experiment  and  share  the  results.
&*'¶VSURSRVDOIRU&DVKRQ'HOLYHU\&2'DLGLVDQH[DPSOH





in   the  number  of   students  who  complete  primary  school  and  
take  a  competency  test.   In   theory,  COD  aid  could  be  applied  
WR DQ\ JRDO IRU ZKLFK D YHUL¿DEOH LQFUHPHQWDO PHDVXUH RI  
SURJUHVVFDQEHLGHQWL¿HGDQGZKLFKLVDJUHHDEOHWRDIXQGHU
and  recipient.
The  ideas  of  COD  aid  have  been  under  discussion  for  several  
years,  and  both  donor  and  recipient  countries  have  expressed  
LQWHUHVW DQG VXSSRUW 3LORW SURJUDPV DUH QRZ JHWWLQJ XQGHU-­
ZD\ LQ (WKLRSLD DQG 7DQ]DQLD %XW ODXQFKLQJ WKH SLORWV KDV
been  a  complex  and  time-­consuming  process,  since  available  

























Figure 2 Figure  2
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in   advance.   Funding   an   innovative   idea   thus   requires   with-­  
drawing   support   from   an   existing   program,   a   slow   and  
GLI¿FXOWSURFHVVHYHQLIWKHSURJUDPLVQRWSHUIRUPLQJDVZHOO  
as  initially  hoped.  
COD  aid   is  but  one  of  dozens  of  new  approaches   to  aid  and  
poverty   reduction   that   should   be   tested   and   evaluated.  What  
are   the   best   techniques   for   increasing   girls’   enrollment   and  
middle-­school   graduation   rates?   What   strategies   work   for  
reducing   maternal   and   infant   mortality?  What   programs   are  
effective   in   getting   kids   vaccinated?   What   works   for  
promoting   small   and   medium-­sized   industries?   How   can  
young  people  who  have  been  uprooted  from  their  communities  
E\ZDU DQG FLYLO XQUHVW²LQFOXGLQJ EHLQJ IRUFHG WR VHUYH DV  
FKLOG VROGLHUV²EH UHLQWHJUDWHG LQWR WKHLU FRPPXQLWLHV ZKHQ
WKH¿JKWLQJHQGV"
Improved  impact  evaluation  techniques,  including  random-­
L]HGFRQWUROOHG WULDOV 5&7VPDNH LW SRVVLEOH WR WHVWQHZ
approaches  to  determine  which  work  best  in  what  settings.  The  
,QWHUQDWLRQDO,QLWLDWLYHIRU,PSDFW(YDOXDWLRQ,(HVWDEOLVKHG
in  2007  and  currently  based   in   India,   serves  as  a   funder  and  
FOHDULQJKRXVH IRU VXFK VWXGLHV 7KH$EGXO /DWHHI -DPHHO
3RYHUW\$FWLRQ/DE-3$/LVRQHRIDKDQGIXORIRUJDQL]D-­
tions   that  specializes   in  carrying  out  such  studies  and  pro-­
mulgating  the  results.
$V D ¿UVW VWHS WRZDUGV HVWDEOLVKLQJ LWV RZQ DLG LQQRYDWLRQ
IXQG.RUHDVKRXOGEHFRPHDPHPEHURIWKH,(7KLVFRXOG
be   done   by   a   variety   of   Korean   government   organizations,  
with   KOICA   as   the   most   logical   lead   entity.   By   becoming  
D PHPEHU .RUHD ZRXOG DOLJQ LWVHOI²DQG KDYH LQFUHDVHG  
RSSRUWXQLWLHVIRULQWHUDFWLRQ²ZLWKPDQ\RIWKHPRVWIRUZDUG
thinking   and   highly   regarded   funders   of   foreign   assistance,  
groups   such   as   the   Bill   and  Melinda   Gates   Foundation,   the  
William  and  Flora  Hewlett  Foundation,   and   the  aid  agencies  
for  Australia,  the  UK,  Norway,  Sweden  and  the  United  States.  
$ ,( PHPEHUVKLS ZRXOG JLYH .RUHDQ RI¿FLDOV DQG SROLF\  
makers   an   opportunity   to   learn   more   about   approaches   to  
impact   evaluation   and   promising   innovations   that   could   be  
worthy  of  Korean  funding.
One   possible   model   for   a   Korean   aid   innovation   fund  
FRXOG EH 86$,'¶V QHZ 'HYHORSPHQW ,QQRYDWLRQ 9HQWXUHV  
',9 FUHDWHG LQ  WR IXQG QHZ GHYHORSPHQW LQLWLDWLYHV  
with   a   strong   emphasis   on   rigorous   evaluation,   learning   and  
dissemination.   It   offers   grants   covering   conceptual,   pilot  
and   scale-­up   phases.   So   far   it   has   awarded   twenty   grants,  
including   an   inexpensive   balloon   tamponade   to   stop   post-­  
partum   bleeding,   a   messaging   campaign   to   reduce   road  
accidents   in   Kenya,   and   grain   storage   bags   to   eliminate  
ORVVHV IURP LQVHFWV DQG PROG LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ 7KH RI¿FH  
accepts   applications  on   a   rolling  basis   and   applicants   do  not  
have  to  be  from  the  United  States.  
Looking   beyond   aid,   Korea   should   seek   ways   to   improve  
non-­aid   policies   that   affect   poor   people   in   developing  
countries.  Here  the  non-­aid  components  of  the  CDI  can  provide  
D YDOXDEOH JXLGH (DFK RI WKH VL[ QRQDLG FRPSRQHQWV RI  
the   index   has  multiple   indicators.   Some,   such   as   restrictions  
RQ PLJUDWLRQ PD\ EH SROLWLFDOO\ YHU\ GLI¿FXOW WR FKDQJH  
Others,   such   as   regulations   concerning   foreign   investment,  
may   encounter   little   opposition   and   indeed   be   welcomed  
by  key  constituencies  who  recognize  an  opportunity  to  do  well  
by   doing   good.  A   summary   of   Korea’s   ranking   on   the   CDI  
is   available   on   the   CGD   Website.1   Highlights   in   the   most  
UHFHQW&',LQFOXGH
Trade:   Korea   has   a   score   of   2.8,   on   a   scale  where   5   is   the  
median,   ranking   21st   out   of   the   22   countries   in   the   Index.  
6WUHQJWKV LQFOXGH ORZ DJULFXOWXUDO VXEVLGLHV UDQNLQJ UG
Weaknesses   include  high   tariffs  on  agricultural  commodities,  
and  high  barriers  against  textiles  and  apparel.  As  Korea  moves  
increasingly  into  high-­technology  manufactured  exports,  these  
high  tariffs  on  goods  produced  by  developing  countries  could  
be  gradually  eased.
Environment:  Korea  scores  2.8  and  ranks  22nd.  Weaknesses  
include  high   tropical  wood   imports,   low  gas   taxes,  high  car-­
ERQHPLVVLRQVSHUFDSLWDDQGKLJK¿VKLQJVXEVLGLHV(DFKRI
WKHVH LV SROLWLFDOO\ VHQVLWLYH DQG WKXV OLNHO\ WREHGLI¿FXOW WR
change.  Nonetheless,  Korea  has  made  green  growth  a  national  
priority,  one  that  would  require  addressing  each  of  these  policy  
areas.  Raising  gas  taxes  could  be  a  good  place  to  start,  since  it  
could  either  increase  revenue  or  make  it  possible  to  cut  taxes  
in  other  areas.  
Security:  Korea  has  a  score  of  1.7  and  ranks  22nd.  Strengths  
include  no  arms  exports  to  poor  and  undemocratic  governments  
UDQN:HDNQHVVHVLQFOXGHVPDOO¿QDQFLDOFRQWULEXWLRQVWR
international   peacekeeping   operations,   an   area   Korea   might  
choose  to  address  for  other  reasons,  including  the  international  
prestige  that  can  come  from  participating  in  such  operations.
Investment:  Rich-­country  investment  in  poorer  countries  can  
WUDQVIHU WHFKQRORJLHV XSJUDGH PDQDJHPHQW DQG FUHDWH MREV
The  CDI  includes  a  checklist  of  policies  that  support  healthy  
investment  in  developing  countries.  Korea  does  relatively  well,  
with  a  score  of  5.9  and  a  rank  of  8.  Strengths  include  providing  
insurance  against  political  risk  for  both  domestic  and  foreign  
¿UPVDQGQRW LPSRVLQJ UHVWULFWLRQVRQ.RUHDQSHQVLRQ IXQG
investments  in  emerging  markets  
Migration:  The  movement  of  people  from  poor  to  rich  countries  
SURYLGHV XQVNLOOHG LPPLJUDQWVZLWK MREV LQFRPH DQG NQRZ
ledge.  Korea   scores  well   in   its   openness   to   foreign   students  
from  developing  countries,  ranking  2nd.  But  the  small  number  
of  unskilled  immigrants  from  developing  countries  is  weighted  
more  heavily  and  puts  Korea  at  the  bottom  of  the  list.
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Technology:  The  CDI  captures  a  country’s  contribution  to  the  
creation   and  dissemination  of  new   technologies  by  measuring  
government  support  for  R&D  and  penalizing  strong  intellectual  
property   rights   regimes   that   limit   the   dissemination   of   new  
technologies  to  poor  countries.  Korea  does  quite  well  on  these  
PHDVXUHV VFRULQJ WRHDUQD UDQNRIQG.RUHD¶VKLJKHVW
rank  on  any  of  the  seven  CDI  components,  due  in  part  to  a  large  
tax  subsidy  rate  for  business  R&D.
7KLV LVDGDXQWLQJ OLVWD UHPLQGHURI MXVWKRZIDU.RUHDKDV  
to   go   to   become   a   true   champion   of   development.   On   the  
other  hand,  Korea’s  overall   average   score  of  3.1  on   the  CDI  
represents  an   increase  of  a   full  point  compared   to  2008,  and  
.RUHD LV RQO\SRLQWVEHKLQG LWV WUDGLWLRQDO UHJLRQDO ULYDO
-DSDQZKLFKKDVEHHQDGHYHORSHGFRXQWU\DQGDLGGRQRUIRU
decades  longer.  
Scores  on  the  CDI  tend  to  change  slowly,  since  the  underlying  
SROLFLHVWKDWWKH\UHÀHFWDUHWKHPVHOYHVVORZWRFKDQJH1RQH-­
theless,  over  time  a  country’s  ranking  does  shift,  and  occasion-­
DOO\DELJSROLF\FKDQJHFDQOHDGWRDODUJHMXPS²RUVXGGHQ
back  sliding.  It  would  be  entirely  in  keeping  with  the  Republic  
of  Korea’s  tradition  of  exceptional  achievement  for  the  govern-­
ment  to  decide  that  it  wants  to  be  the  country  that  has  made  the  
most  rapid  progress  on  the  CDI  and  to   implement  a  few  key  
UHIRUPVWKDWPRYHLWRXWRIODVWSODFHWUXPSLQJ-DSDQ
$JRRG¿UVW VWHS WR OHDUQLQJPRUH²DQGSURYLGLQJ FRPPHQW
RQWKHGHVLJQRIWKHLQGH[LWVHOI²ZRXOGEHIRU.RUHDWRMRLQ
the  CDI  Consortium,  a  club  of  countries  ranked  in  the  CDI  that  
meets  annually   to  share   ideas  about  how  to   improve   the  rich  
world’s  support  for  development.
:RXOG.RUHDMRLQDFOXELQZKLFKLWLVFXUUHQWO\UDQNHGDWWKH
bottom  of  the  list?  I  would  not  be  surprised,  since  this  is  very  
much  in  keeping  with  the  Korean  drive  to  learn  and  excel.  
My   colleague   David   Roodman,   the   architect   of   the   CDI,  
recalled   in   a   blog   post   the   reaction   he   received   when  
SUHVHQWLQJ.RUHDQRI¿FLDOVZLWKWKHLUFRXQWU\¶VVWDQGLQJLQWKH
LQGH[VRRQDIWHU.RUHDMRLQHGWKH2(&''$&
In  conclusion,  Korea  has  made  an  excellent  start  on  becoming  
a   true   global   leader   on   development   and   poverty   reduction,  
drawing  on   its   remarkable   experience   in  moving   from  desti-­
WXWLRQ WR DIÀXHQFH LQ D VLQJOHJHQHUDWLRQ.RUHD¶V OHDGHUVKLS
during  the  Seoul  Summit  in  putting  development  on  the  G-­20  
agenda,  in  hosting  the  Busan  high-­level  conference  on  aid  ef-­
fectiveness,   and   establishing   the  GGGI  have   attracted   favor-­
able  international  attention.  
But  Korea’s  own  policies,   in   foreign  assistance  and   in  non-­  
aid   policies   that   impact   development,   lag   far   behind   its  
rhetoric  and  even  the  relatively  low  standards  of  other  high-­
income   countries.   Fortunately,   there   are   several   steps   that  
Before   releasing   the   CDI   last   year   my  
FROOHDJXH &LQG\ 3ULHWR DQG , YLVLWHG WKH  
Korean   embassy   here   in   Washington   to  
EULHIRI¿FLDOV:HZHUHLPSUHVVHGZLWKWKHLU  
constructive  attitude,  which  blended  respect  
for   the   CDI   and   hope   that   Korea   would  
improve   as   it   took   its   place   among  donors.  
We   congratulate   South   Korea   on   its   new  
status   and  wish   it   the  best   as   it   accepts   the  
attendant  responsibilities.
1KWWSZZZFJGHYRUJGRF&',FRXQWU\BUHSRUWV6RXWKB.RUHDBSGI
Korea  can  take  rather  easily  to  begin  to  address  these  short-­
FRPLQJV7KHVHLQFOXGHMRLQLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOHQWLWLHVVXFKDV  
WKH ,( DQG WKH &',&RQVRUWLXP LPSURYLQJ GHYHORSPHQW
UHODWHGSROLFLHVDQGWKXV.RUHD¶V&',VFRUHLQDUHDVZKHUH
there   is   little  domestic  political  resistance;;  and  setting  aside  
a  percentage  of  Korea’s  modest  aid  budget  as  an  aid  innova-­
tion  fund.  Strikingly,  none  of   these  measures  would  require  
an  increase  in  Korea’s  foreign  aid  spending.  Instead  they  are  
smart  moves  that  are  very  much  within  the  country’s  tradition  
of  punching  above  its  weight  in  the  global  arena.
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